Saleh back to the fore

As intense Yemeni-US attacks on Al-Qaeda continue, former president Saleh appears to be regaining popular support, writes Nasser Arrabyee

Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is still plying politics, with millions of supporters around him.

On Monday morning, 3 September, he was driving in the middle of capital, Sanaa, with hundreds of bodyguards and loyal politicians on their way to the country's biggest conference hosting location.

Thousands of men and women and children were carrying his picture and chanting, cheering and trying to get closer to his car when the procession arrived outside the Stadium of 22 May in the northern part of Sanaa.

More than 10,000 members of Saleh's party, the People's General Congress (PGC), and guest politicians and diplomats were waiting inside to start a well-prepared ceremony to celebrate the 30th anniversary of PGC that was founded by Saleh in 1982.

In a lengthy speech being aired live on three TV channels and FM radio owned by members of the PGC, Saleh urged his supporters to stand and cooperate with his successor, newly elected President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, in coming national dialogue in November.

Although President Hadi is the secretary-general and deputy chairman of the PGC, with Saleh still the head, he did not attend the ceremony Monday in an effort to show neutrality.

Saleh strongly criticised the national unity government that is chaired by his opponents (a coalition of Islamists, socialists, and Nasserites) who were behind the 2011 uprising against him.

Although Saleh's party has 17 ministers in the 34-member cabinet, he described the government as "failed and incapable".

Saleh added that the government keeps displacing its failure upon him. "Even if a storm happens in the United States, they will say Saleh did it," he said as his supporters applauded and cheered.

"What did you do to those who bombed the oil and gas, and those who blocked the roads and those who sabotaged the electricity towers? Did you put them on trial?" Saleh, who now plays the role of the figurehead of opposition, asked the government.

The Saudi capital Riyadh is hosting this week (starting Tuesday, 4 September) a conference for donors to Yemen, who include Gulf countries, Europeans, the Americans, and other countries. Yemen needs more than $10 billion to fix the economic problems it is facing during the transitional period.

Saleh thanked particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kuwait for their support for Yemen. Ironically, he thanked Qatar for "pumping" dollars to his opponents during the protests of last year.

The UN envoy to Yemen, Jamal Bin Omar, is meanwhile scheduled to arrive in Sanaa Thursday, 6 September, to continue helping the conflicting parties implement the Saudi-sponsored and US-backed deal that is supposed to entirely end the country's political crisis by conducting presidential elections in February 2014.

The success of the national dialogue in November will be the most important step of all steps taken so far since the deal was signed by Saleh and his opponents in Riyadh in November 2011.

WAR ON AL-QAEDA: The war on Al-Qaeda conducted by the Yemeni army and US drones is continuing. Al-Qaeda is still exploiting the current chaos and the mistakes of the Yemeni and American governments to recruit more and more angry youth.

On Sunday, a US drone attack missed an Al-Qaeda leader and mistakenly killed more than 12 people in Radaa, one of the strongholds in the southeast of the country.

The drone, seemingly, was targeting the car of Abdel-Raof Al-Dhahab, but its missile hit a car carrying 12 people including three from one family -- a father, mother and daughter -- according to local residents. The two cars were driving in Al-Hema area in Al-Masaneh, the main stronghold of Al-Qaeda in Radaa.

Khaled Musalam Batis, another Al-Qaeda leader, was killed by a US drone attack last Friday in the area of Hawrah in Al-Kutn district of the eastern province of Hudhrmout, according to official statements.

Khaled was killed with eight other operatives while driving their cars. He was the brother of Salah Musalam Batis, a leading member of the Islamist party, Islah (the Yemeni Brotherhood), in Hudhrmout. The Batis family identified their son from among the dead bodies found under the wreckage of the car that was hit by a missile.

A group of clerics said the US drone attacks would turn Yemen to another Waziristan after an anti-Al-Qaeda cleric was mistakenly killed in a drone attack, sparking outrage among the people.

The group to which he belonged, calling themselves the Union of Southern Clerics, said in a statement sent to media that "the drone attacks are violating [Yemeni] sovereignty and [are a] flagrant aggression."

A total of eight Al-Qaeda operatives were killed when an airstrike hit two cars in the area of Al-Khashaa, 40 kilometres west of Al-Kutn in the eastern province of Hudhrmout, according to the government-run media.

Local residents believe that all the air attacks are implemented by US drones, not by Yemeni fighter jets, their evidence being the accuracy of the attacks.

The clerics, in their statement, said one of them was killed in a recent attack when a US drone killed four Al-Qaeda operatives who were in a meeting with the cleric.

The cleric, Salem Ahmed Ali Jaber, was a teacher and mosque speaker in Al-Kutn. Jaber is Salafi and studied in the main Salafi centre of Saada. He was outspoken against Al-Qaeda. In recent sermons he said Al-Qaeda is against Islam.

According to local sources, Al-Qaeda sent last week four operatives to the cleric to redress him and while the five were in the meeting a US drone came and killed them all in the area of Al-Khshamer in Al-Kutn.

The Yemeni army in cooperation with US drones intensified attacks on Al-Qaeda operatives who try to regroup in new places after they were driven out from Zinjubar and Jaar and Azzan in June.

Sources said that Yemeni troops are being redeployed in areas close to the mountains of Marakish of Abyan in clear preparation for an attack on the newly established stronghold of Al-Mahfad where Al Qaeda train their fighters.

Earlier in the week, Al-Qaeda threatened to bomb oil and gas installations in the south if the army attacked them in Al-Mahfad, an area between Shabwa and Abyan.

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In Focus: Peace treaty must be revised

Insecurity in Sinai could engulf the whole country, already teetering following the revolution. Egypt must act, which means first untying its hands, writes Galal Nassar

Egypt is in a state of disarray. In spite of the great Egyptian grassroots revolution, anarchy remained the primary trait of the transitional period, regardless of the degree to which it was fed by political developments, constitutional and legal controversies, and major and minor events in the capital, up and down the Nile from Alexandria to Aswan, and along the fringes of the country, in Sinai, Al-Wadi Al-Gadid and Marsa Matrouh. The chaos, aggravated by mounting polarisations between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood, and other political forces, has persisted in spite of the election of a new president. But more than any other locus of tension in the country, the current conflict in Sinai epitomises the crisis of the erosion of central control, security breakdown, and their socio-political and strategic ramifications. The recent events in Sinai, which were triggered by the terrorist attack that killed 16 Egyptian soldiers, cast to the fore numerous crucial domestic and foreign policy questions not least of which are the security of Sinai and Egyptian-Israeli relations.

The situation in Sinai had already begun to deteriorate well before the January Revolution. This was largely due to two factors. The first was the security agencies' mismanagement of a series of difficulties and crises in that area, generating a growing gap between the people of Sinai and the central government. On one side, some entertained doubts as to the patriotism of the Sinai Bedouin in spite of the fact that they bore the burden of the resistance against the Israeli occupation of Sinai following the 1967 war. On the other was mounting resentment against a regime that ignored the developmental needs of Sinai, failed to open job opportunities to Sinai youth in tourist projects that proliferated after control over the area was restored to Egypt, and did not recruit them into military academies as a means to assimilate Sinai's society into national structures. The second factor was the spread of extremist thought in a religious guise during the Sadat and Mubarak eras. Almost intrinsically hostile to many domestic and foreign policy orientations, that type of thought inevitably spread to Sinai.

As the situation in Sinai deteriorated in the Mubarak era, Israel increasingly began to complain that this posed a threat to its own security. While a chief cause of that situation -- the malpractices of the security agencies -- may have been eliminated following the January Revolution, the grip of the central state had weakened at the same time. In Sinai, that grip became almost non-existent. The result was an unprecedented boost to terrorist groups operating in that area. They became increasingly active and more and more audacious until the latest tragic attack. The repercussions of their activities also became increasingly dangerous, especially after Israel was forced to respond to the latest attack when two of the terrorists stormed across the border into Israeli territory. Israel has since seized upon this incident as a pretext for levelling harsh criticisms against Egyptian policy in Sinai and calling into question Egypt's ability to control that peninsula. This, in turn, has stirred suspicions in Egypt that Israel may be planning to reoccupy part of Sinai or to grant itself licence to undertake military operations there or, at the very least, to call for an international force to be stationed on our side of the border.

Islamist political forces and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in particular were quick to accuse Israel of being behind the latest attack, though to be fair a number of non-Islamist forces shared the opinion. Nevertheless, I believe that part of the Islamists' motive for pointing fingers in that direction was to deflect blame from themselves. The terrorists espouse extremist ideas that they erroneously attribute to Islam, upon which Islamist forces presumably base their political legitimacy. Also, in the immediate aftermath of the Rafah attack, President Mohamed Mursi came under fire for his "ill-considered" decision to establish closer relations with Hamas. It was argued that steps taken in this context made it easier for terrorist groups in Gaza to coordinate with and join their counterparts in Sinai in order to carry out the attack. Mursi was simultaneously criticised for his decision to grant amnesties to prisoners who had been found guilty of involvement in terrorist attacks that had claimed the lives of many Egyptians and foreigners. The critics hold that the amnesties helped create a climate conducive to terrorism which encouraged those who carried out the Rafah attack and could inspire similar attacks in the future, and all the more so if the newly released persons turn around and issue supportive "fatwas" or even actively collude in plots.

Naturally, there is always some logical basis for suspecting Israel. It remains the foremost threat to Egypt's national security to which history offers ample testimony. However, if blame is to be cast, at the very least it should be founded upon concrete evidence and clearheaded reasoning so that we do not find ourselves chasing after groundless hypotheses that prevent us from properly attributing responsibility and, hence, from ending the vicious cycle of insecurity and instability in Sinai. Proceeding from this basis, three observations weaken the contention that Israel was behind the recent attack. First, it issued several warnings of an impending attack and sufficiently in advance to give Egyptian security agencies time to take precautions. Second, sources in SCAF mentioned that the terrorists had received support from inside Gaza while they were carrying out their operation. Apparently, mortar bombs were fired from the vicinity of Gaza airport with the purpose of distracting Israeli forces from what was happening in Sinai. Third, there is no denying the already dangerously deteriorating situation that existed in Sinai and the gross negligence on our part in handling that situation. That security breakdown, mismanagement, general anarchy and disintegration at the fringes helped clear the way for the operation, regardless of the ideological or national affiliation of the perpetrators.

So, what needs to be done? Egyptian military command has deployed land and air forces, destroyed tunnels that are often suspected of being used as a transit for terrorists, and laid siege to rugged mountainous areas used as terrorist hideouts. Often such measures produce immediate results. Unfortunately, however, the benefit is temporary because they fail to address the root causes. Recourse to the "iron fist" approach cannot, in and of itself, remedy the security breakdown, the root causes of which are to be found in economic, social and educational problems that lay the grounds for extremism. Simultaneously, the "iron fist" approach will remain a kind of mirage unless the protocols of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty are revised, especially with regards to the deployment of Egyptian forces in Area C in Sinai. The provisions of those protocols were originally devised on the basis of two fallacious assumptions: firstly, that Egypt poses a threat to Israeli security rather than the reverse; and secondly, that the only threat that Egypt faces comes from Israel. Theoretically, under a peace agreement, both assumptions are invalid. Be that as it may, the situation has changed radically since 1979, which should be reason enough for revising the treaty or even abolishing it. We cannot rule out, at this juncture, the possibility that some ultra-extremist forces assume power in Israel and execute a plan to reoccupy all or part of Sinai, or assume the right to send in forces in pursuit of targets or other "security" aims. More immediately, the provisions of the treaty do not reflect the reality that terrorism in Sinai is an immediate threat to Egypt before being a potential threat to Israel. While Israel has certainly given the Egyptian military command the green light to bring in forces that are not necessarily provided for under the arrangements of the peace agreement for the purpose of counterterrorist operations, there is no logical reason why Egypt should remain at the mercy of the whims of this or that Israeli government for permission to deploy our forces as needed on our own territory.

It follows that our primary concern, now, should be to push for a revision of the unfair conditions of the protocols of the peace treaty. Indeed, President Mursi should declare this as one of his foremost priorities. The treaty does provide for the possibility of amendment, but it requires the agreement of both sides in order to set the process into motion. Therefore, as a first step, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry should submit an official request to Israel for this purpose and the president should form a negotiating team, reminiscent of our "Taba team", consisting of our best legal, military and diplomatic experts. At the same time, we should pre-empt possible Israeli intransigence by bringing in reinforcements into Area C in sufficient force to confront the threat of terrorism in Sinai, for otherwise we will be laying ourselves open to the likelihood that intermittent terrorist attacks will escalate into a flood that could overflow the bounds of Sinai and threaten the entire country.

We cannot overstate the need to succeed in restoring security to Sinai. Success there will reverse the trend of deterioration and mounting anarchy and herald the restoration of stability throughout the country.

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Squaring up on Syria

With Egypt stepping into the Syrian quagmire, Shia-Sunni rivalries are increasing as a result of the Syrian civil war, writes Salah Nasrawi

With Syria's civil war degenerating into a sectarian showdown, tensions are building across the Middle East over its fallout, with growing signs that key regional players are increasingly taking sides in the conflict.

Regional rivalries over Syria's protracted war, which is pitching the country's Sunni majority against the minority Alawite-dominated regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, is complicating the conflict and raising alarms about its potential for Middle East instability.

New signs have emerged that Iraq and Iran are now teaming up to increase their help to the embattled Al-Assad regime, in stark contrast with Egypt, whose newly installed Islamist leadership is joining other Arab Sunni governments in seeking to get rid of the Syrian regime.

Last week, the Iraqi Shia-led government and Iranian leaders renewed pledges to support Al-Assad, who is facing a mostly Sunni uprising backed by Sunni governments in Turkey and the Gulf.

The new development came after Egyptian president Mohamed Mursi announced that Al-Assad had "lost legitimacy" in his fight to crush the 17-month-old revolt and bluntly called on him to go.

Mursi, a senior leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Sunni world's most powerful Islamist organisation, stunned his Iranian hosts at a Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran last Thursday by likening the uprising in Syria to the struggle of the Palestinians.

That contradicts the line put out by Iran and Iraq, who have resisted efforts to oust Al-Assad and fear that the fall of the Alawite-dominated regime in Syria would embolden the country's Sunnis and upset the region's shaky sectarian geopolitics.

In response, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose Shia nation is Al-Assad's main ally, described the anti-Assad uprising as "a proxy war" waged by governments that "provide money and arms to irresponsible groups."

Syria and its allies accuse Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey of giving financial support and arms supplies to the armed insurgent groups on the ground in Syria. The three countries are reportedly running a clandestine base in Turkey that is working to topple Al-Assad.

Khamenei, who appeared to criticise Mursi for being too harsh on Al-Assad, said the Syrian uprising was led by the United States "with the aim of serving the interests of the Zionists against the resistance in the region."

In a meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki who had traveled to Iran to participate in the summit, Khamenei said Iran, which has assumed the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Iraq, which holds the presidency of the Arab League, can play effective roles in resolving regional issues.

In addressing the summit, Al-Maliki submitted a plan to end the conflict in Syria based on a halt to the violence and the formation of a national unity government that could include Al-Assad.

Under the plan, the Syrian regime would negotiate with opposition groups and elections would take place under international and Arab League supervision.

The proposal rejected foreign military intervention, included an agreement by all parties in Syria to end the violence, and incorporated calls for all countries to "stop interfering in Syria's internal affairs."

Iraq, which shares a 375-mile (600-kilometre) border with Syria, has repeatedly cautioned that the crisis in Syria could spill over into other regional and neighbouring states if they do not work seriously to stop the violence and promote talks.

Last month, Iraq's military dispatched additional troops to tighten border controls with Syria in an attempt to staunch the spillover from the Syrian crisis. Thousands of Sunni Muslim fighters, including Al-Qaeda jihadists from Iraq, are believed to be fighting alongside the rebels in Syria.

They are widely expected to turn their guns against Shia-ruled Iraq once the Al-Assad regime has been removed in Syria.

Fearful of the potential rise of a hard-line Sunni regime next door, Iraq's Shia groups are reportedly rearming in southern Iraq. Reports in the local media suggest that Iraqi Sunni groups are setting up a "Free Iraqi Army" that would be ready to operate following Al-Assad's downfall.

Several top Shia religious leaders have also issued fatwas, or religious rulings, banning their followers in southern Iraq from selling their weapons after local media reports said there have been massive transfers of weapons to Syrian opposition groups throughout the area.

These are unconfirmed reports, but they send chilling signs of how ugly the Syrian conflict could turn out to be.

The new wrangling that involves Iraq, Iran and Egypt shows how sharply different visions of Syria's future could increase polarisation and fan the flames of religious tension in the region.

For now, the row could forestall proposals made by Mursi earlier to end the conflict in Syria that would include Iran together with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The quartet idea was seen as a good option for resolving the conflict, as it seemed to transcend the regional sectarian divide. However, it is far from guaranteed to succeed because both Al-Assad and his opponents see victory as the only desirable outcome in Syria.

Though it was hazy on many details, the idea meant that Mursi should have worked much more actively in order to win Iran's cooperation in mediating an end to the Syrian crisis that would avoid terrible sectarian conflict in the region.

Moreover, Mursi's efforts were hoped to bring the region's crucial Sunni and Shia players together as events in Syria unfold, especially with a view to the aftermath of the crisis.

The initiative was hailed by many inside and outside Egypt as a major diplomatic bid by Egypt's first elected president and first Islamist leader to recapture Egypt's leadership that many believe had been ceded to Saudi Arabia and even the tiny Gulf emirate of Qatar.

Now Mursi has backed himself into a corner in Syria, and there are few good options for a breakthrough as regional and international diplomacy scrambles to contain the violence and keep the conflict from spilling across borders.

Given that his plan for regional mediation had little chance to succeed, it's hard to know whether by annoying Iran and Iraq in his Tehran speech Mursi has changed his calculus on Syria.

By slamming Al-Assad and berating Shia Iran for its support of the regime, Mursi seems to have been appeasing many of his own sceptics. Turkey had been cautious about his overture, apparently for fear that it could undermine its own assumed leadership role in the crisis.

It was also always doubtful that Saudi Arabia would sit down with its arch enemy, Shia Iran, while Washington had killed off a previous bid to involve Iran by the UN's former Syria envoy Kofi Annan.

Inside Egypt, Sunni Muslim Salafis who do not hide their hatred of Shias and staunchly support efforts to oust Syria's Alawite regime were quick to welcome Mursi's denunciation of Al-Assad.

Whatever the calculations may be, Mursi seems to have shot down his own Syrian initiative and probably lost his chance to reassert Egypt's role as a key Middle Eastern player.

That could give a new push to regional polarisation. Some Iranian officials have warned that Tehran, which has signed a military cooperation pact with Damascus, will do what ever it takes to prevent Al-Assad's downfall.

By floating his spoiler plan that includes Al-Assad in the resolution of the Syrian conflict, Iraq's Al-Maliki is showing his solidarity with Al-Assad. Lebanon's Shia group Hizbullah has also showed strong backing for the Syrian leader.

In the meantime, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar continue to fund arms for the Syrian opposition. None of this augurs well for a breakthrough in the standoff in Syria, or for Middle Eastern sectarian harmony.

With each camp throwing its weight behind one of the warring parties in Syria, the region looks to be plunging into a sharper divide than ever along sectarian lines.

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Ex-Mexican official to be sentenced in San Diego

SAN DIEGO (AP) — Jesus Quinonez traveled often to San Diego to discuss cross-border investigations of organized crime with U.S. law enforcement officials. He didn't know he was the target of one himself.

The former Mexican law enforcement official faces a possible sentence of life in federal prison Monday when he is sentenced for racketeering conspiracy, more than two years after he and 42 others were charged in a far-reaching indictment that targeted remnants of Tijuana-based Arellano Felix cartel. Prosecutors have recommended that Quinonez be sentenced to eight years, one month in prison.

Quinonez was the international liaison for Baja California Attorney General Rommel Moreno, serving as his primary contact with U.S. federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in an area that includes the border cities of Tijuana and Mexicali. He pleaded guilty in May, weeks before he was scheduled for trial.

As part of the plea agreement, Quinonez admitted that he agreed to smuggle help smuggle $13 million into Mexico for a group headed by Fernando Sanchez Arellano, a nephew of the Arellano Felix brothers. The Arellano Felix cartel was once one of the world's most powerful drug cartels but its power began to erode in 2002 when its leaders began getting killed or captured.

Quinonez also admitted sharing information with a reputed Sanchez Arellano lieutenant, Jose Alfredo Najera Gil, about an investigation of a double-homicide in Tijuana in March 2010. According to the plea agreement, the murders were committed by the Sanchez Arellano gang.

The episode has been an embarrassment for Moreno, who took office in late 2007 when Tijuana was in the throes of a fierce battle between Sanchez Arellano and a rival that horrified residents with bodies hung from bridges, daytime shootouts and decapitated bodies found around town. Such gruesome displays of violence have largely disappeared in Tijuana since the Sinaloa cartel expanded its presence in the last few years.

Quinonez has been in custody since his arrest on a San Diego traffic stop in July 2010, less than a month after he attended a U.S. Independence Day party at the home of the U.S. consul general in Tijuana.

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The Merchants of Venice

Samir Farid reports from the centre of the world

The 69th round of the Venice Film Festival (29 Augest-8 September) ?ê" the most prestigious in the world, and the third to take place annually after Berlin in February and Cannes in May ?ê" is this year celebrating 80 years since its first round.

Among the most memorable rounds in the history of Venice was that of 1983, which saw the first ever history-of-cinema programme in the world, curated by Francesco Bassinini, and that of 1949, when the grand prix was first called the Golden Lion after the lion of Saint Mark, the emblem of the city. Following years of disruption, the festival became established in 1980, competing with Cannes and Berlin.

The 2012 round is the first to be directed by the celebrated film scholar Alberto Barbera, taking over from the brilliant Marco Muller, who directed the festival for the last eight years. Barbera directed the festival in the period 1999-2002, after which he directed the National Film Museum in Turin. Barbera might see the festival differently to Muller, but a quick look at the programme is all it takes to realise he will maintain the success achieved by his predecessor. As is immediately evident, where Muller pays as much attention to quantity as quality and likes all kinds of films, Barbera is rather more interested in quality; and he prefers auteur films to others.

To celebrate 80 years since the first round, besides selections from the institution's archives entitled "80!", Barbera introduced a programme named Venice Classics, which will screen 20 restored films produced in the period 1974-84 in the US, the UK, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Japan and the Philippines as well as nine new feature-length documentaries on cinema from the US, Italy, France and Mexico.

Aside from films by Terrence Malick and Paul-Thomas Anderson, Marco Bellocchio, Brian de Palma and Takishi Kitano, the festival opened with the Qatari-American production The Reluctant Fundamentalist by Mira Nair ?ê" an out-of-competition screening. This was the first time in film history that any of the three major festivals opened with an Arab coproduction; it reflects Qatar's ambition to establish itself as a powerful state with international influence despite its small size and population, capitalising on its oil revenues to interact with contemporary world civilisation. The coproduction took place through the Doha Film Institute, headed by Princess Al-Mayyassa bint Hamad Al-Thani who is well-known for her love of the arts, which also organises the annual Doha-Tribeca Film Festival.

In fact, thanks to the Arab Spring, there is a remarkable Arab contribution to Venice this year, from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Palestine and, for the first time, Libya and Saudi Arabia as well: feature-length documentaries by Libyan filmmaker Abdalla Omaish's (Witness: Libya, an American production, the first on the Libyan revolution by a Libyan) and Tunisian filmmaker Hinde Boujemaa (Ya man aach or "It was better tomorrow") outside the competition; the Egyptian filmmaker Ibrahim El-Batout's El-Sheita Elli Fat (Winter of Discontent) in the Orizzonte or "Horizons" section; and, also outside the competition, Algerian filmmaker Djamila Sahraoui's Yema and Saudi filmmaker Haifaa Al Mansour's Wadjda, a French and German production, respectively: the first fiction feature ever to be shot in Saudi territory.

***

El-Batout's El-Sheita Elli Fat is an example of the kind of western interest the Arab Spring has generated in Arab cinema. For even though such momentous events in one of the world's most important sources of energy and the site of fundamentalist-secular conflict can encourage attention to the work of such a young artist on the topic, it is also true that films are selected for screening at the major festivals based on artistic merit alone. If Youssri Nassrallah is among the icons of innovation in Egyptian cinema through the 1980s, then Ibrahim El-Batout is an icon of the independent cinema movement that emerged as the most important development in the 1990s; it may in fact be said that El-Batout is the godfather of independent cinema.

He arrived on the film scene from outside it and in 1996 began to make documentaries in some of the world's hottest spots. He made his first full-length fiction feature, Ithaka, named after CP Cavafy's poem, in 2004. With his second film, Ain Shams (Heliopolis), he managed to cross the Mediterranean and make a name for himself in the world at large ?ê" a reputation he confirmed with Hawi (Conjuror) in 2010. With his present, fourth film, El-Batout arrives at the world's most prestigious film festival.

The independent movements in art, music, theatre and literature as well as film played an essential role in forging the consciousness that led to the 25 January revolution. They were paralleled by political initiatives, notably Kifaya which started in 2004. With actors Amr Waked and Farah Youssef ?ê" the stars of El-Sheita Elli Fat ?ê" El-Batout was among those who took part in the 18-day sit-in that toppled former president Hosny Mubarak in 25 January-11 February, 2011; the closing scene was shot on 10 February in Tahrir Square. Here as elsewhere in El-Batout's work, the film does not follow a pre-written script; it emerges, rather, from place and time through the characters, gradually taking holistic form until it reaches completion. Like any postmodern filmmaker, El-Batout makes no distinction between fiction and documentary.

This is particularly true of El-Sheita Elli Fat, which documents the revolution subjectively and expresses an equally subjective, sharp position against the regime the revolution sought to change ?ê" the artist's absolute support for the revolution. This is achieved through three pivotal characters: Amr (Amr Waked), a computer wiz; his girlfriend Farah (Farah Youssef), a government TV anchor; and Adel (Saleh El-Hanafi), a State Security officer. Instead of a story with a beginning, a middle and an end, here as elsewhere El-Batout presents interpersonal relations whose dynamics determine the destiny of each. The situation is presented without apparent artifice: While Amr lives with his mother in an average middle-class apartment, Adel lives in a luxurious home with his wife, son and daughter and their Filipina maid.

The film opens on 25 January while Amr, on his computer screen, is watching a State Security detainee recount what happened to him in the way of torture by electric shock, among other means. At the same time Farah, on air, is trying to truthfully describe what is happening on the street while her colleague, in the same show, is misleading viewers to please his boss who demands that they should downplay the significance of the demonstrations. In the first half of the film, the action moves between January 2009 and January 2011, when Amr is arrested once again. As he watches the internet video, Amr remembers what happened to him in January 2009, when ?ê" unannounced and without trial ?ê" he was arrested and detained indefinitely for demonstrating against the Israeli war on Gaza that year. In the detention centre he too was subjected to torture, and there he made the acquaintance of Adel ?ê" who will not release him until he is convinced that Amr will cooperate with State Security, planting in him the doubt that Farah too cooperates; otherwise should couldn't have been a successful anchor. Amr leaves the detention centre with a broken spirit to find out that his mother has died of grief after looking for him everywhere and failing to find him.

On 28 January we hear portions of Mubarak's first address, sound only. Farah revolts against her employers' pro-regime policies, leaving her work to join the revolution. On 1 February Mubarak's second speech is heard, once again without pictures; we see the "popular committees" that have cropped up to replace the police throughout Cairo; we also see how State Security begins to deploy thugs against the protesters, with Adel overseeing the storage of knives and canes in an apartment near Tahrir Square. Thus begin the cycles of violence: protesters kill a thug in retaliation. On 10 February comes Mubarak's third ?ê" and last ?ê" address, followed by Omar Soliman's speech on 11 February in which he announces Mubarak's stepping down. Once again, the picture does not accompany the sound. Throughout the film the viewer sees the events of the revolution on non-Egyptian satellite channels through television sets in houses and in Adel's office. El-Batout uses subtitles to specify dates. Documentary footage of demonstrations in Tahrir Square accompany Soliman's speech.

Adel goes to see his family in the Red Sea resort of Ain Sokhna, where he has asked them to stay. We see the doctor Rafik William, who was arrested with Amr Waked on 28 January and testified that he did join the revolution because he wanted a better life for his as yet unborn son; subtitles tell us that Rafik was killed in the wake of the revolution, a month after the birth of his son. On Qaserelnil Bridge, near Tahrir Square, the actors-characters gather after they have finished making their film; the final shot shows Amr and Farah together again. Subtitles give figures for the dead, the injured, the lost and those in custody with the phrase "Still counting".

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Man with scissors arrested at Miley Cyrus' house

LOS ANGELES (AP) — A man allegedly clutching a pair of scissors was arrested after police say he tried to force himself inside the Los Angeles home of Miley Cyrus.

Los Angeles police Lt. Brian Wendling says that employees inside the house in the Studio City area called police around 4 a.m. Saturday after the man came to the door and claimed to be a friend of the 19-year-old singer-actress.

Wendling says the suspect then repeatedly threw himself against an outside wall as if he was trying to break into the house. Cyrus was not home at the time.

The man, who was not identified, was arrested after officers saw him jump behind some bushes. He was carrying a pair of scissors.

Wendling says charges have not yet been filed.

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Mayor of New Jersey's capital arrested on corruption charge

TRENTON, New Jersey (Reuters) - The mayor of Trenton, New Jersey's state capital, was arrested at his home early on Monday and charged with public corruption in connection with a proposed parking garage on city-owned property, the FBI said.

Mayor Tony Mack, along with his brother Ralphiel Mack and longtime associate Joseph Giorgianni, are accused of plotting to accept $119,000 from a man posing as a developer, according to a copy of the criminal complaint obtained by the Star-Ledger newspaper and posted on its website.

The mayor's brother and Giorgianni acted as intermediaries to the purported parking garage developer and to his consultant, who were both cooperating with authorities, the complaint said.

Tony Mack, Ralphiel Mack and Giorgianni took $54,000 in cash bribes and anticipated getting the balance of $65,000, the complaint said.

Tony Mack was arrested at about 6:30 a.m. on Monday at his home in Trenton, said Barbara Woodruff, FBI spokeswoman in Newark, New Jersey. Giorgianni also was arrested on Monday, the FBI said. Ralphiel Mack turned himself in to authorities on Monday morning.

Giorgianni, who goes by the nicknames "JoJo" and "the Fat Man," told the purported consultant that the men were "'all looking to, uh, get healthy,' meaning make money, and that 'we been sick too long here,'" the complaint said.

The mayor has been under investigation since September 2010 by federal agents who used wiretaps to record meetings at JoJo's Steakhouse in Trenton, run by Giorgianni, and wiretaps on their telephones, the complaint said.

In July, FBI agents staged an early morning raid on Tony Mack's home and searched offices in City Hall.

Tony Mack, who the complaint said goes by the nicknames "the Little Guy" and "Napoleon," has been accused by critics of nepotism and mismanagement since taking office in 2010 in the crime-plagued, economically depressed city of 85,000.

After the FBI raid on his home in July, Tony Mack said he had done nothing wrong.

"We have not violated the public trust in any way," he said at the time. The mayor in July also denied to federal agents that he accepted any illegal cash, the complaint said.

In a search of Ralphiel Mack's home in July, federal agents found $2,500 in $100 bills with the same serial numbers as bills Giorgianni accepted from the purported consultant a month earlier, the complaint said.

In April, according to the complaint, Giorgianni told the purported consultant that the mayor was pleased with a bribe that had been paid.

"Yeah, oh yeah ... listen, you know money makes a blind man see," Giorgianni is quoted as saying.

Giorgianni also said the mayor could not be directly involved in the plot because he was "'under a microscope' due to public scrutiny," the complaint said.

An effort to recall Mack, a Democrat, failed last year when organizers did not get enough support to force a special election.

Mack was slated to appear before a federal magistrate in Trenton later on Monday, the FBI said.

(Writing by Ellen Wulfhorst, Editing by Eric Beech)

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Intruder arrested at home of Miley Cyrus

SAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) - A man suspected of kidnapping his two young children and fleeing with them aboard a stolen yacht along the Northern California coast has been arrested, and the youngsters safely returned to their mother, police and the U.S. Coast Guard said on Saturday. Christopher Maffei, 43, who was taken into custody on Friday evening off Monterey, California, is accused of abducting his son and daughter on Tuesday from their mother's home in South San Francisco, according to police. ...

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Odd bedfellows

The United States and the Muslim Brotherhood are not as far apart as they can sometimes seem, writes Bassem Hassan

The Egyptian presidential race kept many people on their toes in anticipation of the changes it would bring, among others things to Egyptian-American relations. But two months after President Mohamed Mursi was sworn in, it is more or less business as usual. American officials are still welcome in Cairo, where they exchange compliments with their Egyptian counterparts and now also with the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders. For his part, Mursi is packing for his first trip to Washington. Both anxieties about, and hopes for, a major change in Egyptian-American relations have been misplaced, based on the rhetoric of the Brotherhood and of American officials.

Less attention has been paid to the long history of cooperation between the United States and Sunni Muslim conservative regimes and groups. Statements meant for the appeasement of domestic constituencies aside, the American-Sunni conservative alliance has been one of the most enduring features of politics in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In fact, America's entry to the Arab world in 1945 was through Saudi Arabia, the chief patron of Sunni-conservatism in the Arab world. In the post-World War II world, both America and Sunni conservatives found common enemies in nationalist leaders such as former presidents Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Egypt and Sukarno in Indonesia.

Then came the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The United States, the Saudis, the Pakistanis and Sunni Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, generously chipped in to this inter-faith project against the infidel communists that had taken over Afghanistan. Many believed that the events of 9/11 were some type of closure to this not-so-secret love affair. However, they were wrong, as America quickly re-established it: as US journalist Seymour Hersh revealed in The New Yorker magazine a few years ago, the two reunited to confront the Syria-Hizbullah-Iran alliance, and after Israel's failure to destroy Hizbullah in Lebanon, Washington decided to put its money on Sunni-conservatism instead.

The cooperation between America and its allies in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and various jihadist groups to topple the Syrian regime, now denoted as Alawi rather than pan-Arab or socialist as part of the manufacturing of a new terminology that fits the current confrontation better, is just the latest manifestation of this renewed partnership. Even Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has felt it was time to reconnect with his roots and to abandon his previous partnership plans with Syria and Iran.

During the brief breakup following the events of 9/11, cooperation between America and Sunni-conservatism did not come to a complete halt, as evinced by the collaboration between Iraqi politician Tareq Al-Hashimi's Islamic Party and the American occupation authorities in Iraq. Hence, when it comes to exploring the prospects of Egyptian-American relations a good place to start is by examining the interests of the Brotherhood and the United States, rather than looking at their public statements. After all, politicians, including pious brethren, tend to lie whenever it is expedient for them to do so.

For some time to come the Brotherhood in Egypt will have only one goal: to stay in power. Other political groups, with the possible exception of the Salafis, lack the means to challenge them in any upcoming elections. Using the state machinery, now under their control, the Brotherhood will try to ensure that this situation does not change anytime soon. This leaves them with two hurdles to climb over: Egypt's collapsed economy and the military.

The latter still has the capacity to significantly influence the outcome of the political process in this country, the brethren's jubilation following the recent changes in its leadership notwithstanding. America's support is also crucial to overcoming these challenges. Fortunately for the Brotherhood, America is more than willing to help since its main interests in Egypt -- the Suez Canal, the treaty with Israel, the establishment of a pluralist political system, the deeper integration of Egypt in the globalised capitalist system and the maintenance of close relations with the army -- are not threatened by the Brotherhood's ascendancy. Quite the contrary: the brethren could serve these interests.

The Brotherhood could bestow on US-favoured neo-liberal policies and the American-Egyptian alliance two types of legitimacy, one electoral and one religious. The Sadat-Mubarak regime failed to accomplish this, and the liberal parties supported by the business community are not up to the job. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, seems more than willing to play ball. It long ago abandoned the anti-capitalist spirit espoused by some of its ideologues in the mid-20th century. Its current leadership includes ardent free-market supporters like Khairat El-Shater and Hassan Malik. The latter, as the US magazine Businessweek aptly put it, can "easily blend in with the Wall Street crowd".

The current debate about a future IMF loan to Egypt is also quite revealing in this respect. A few years ago Mursi, then an MP, slammed such loans as un-Islamic. Ironically, today he is touting an IMF loan as his first economic achievement. American visitors who frequented the Brotherhood's headquarters after the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak must have realised that they see eye-to-eye with the brethren when it comes to the economy. In contrast, Ahmed Shafik, Mursi's competitor in the elections, expressed a commitment to the role of the state in the economy. In so doing, he was in line with the traditional view of the military, which averted the privatisation of the main state-owned banks in Egypt in the past. The military itself also runs what could be considered to be an "informal public sector" that has so far evaded the IMF. These assets are a coveted prize for the Brotherhood, which did not share in the spoils of the privatisations carried out under Mubarak.

The Brotherhood and the United States also share an interest in curtailing the political influence of the army. The former's reasons are quite obvious; the latter's require some elaboration. The United States has what is best described as a love-hate relationship with the Egyptian military. On the one hand, it is its main weapons supplier and training provider, a position that it is planning to maintain. On the other hand, it is not in favour of the army's economic role in Egypt and is concerned about its political intentions.

It suffices, in this respect, to highlight the fact that the military made a series of decisions that alarmed Washington more than the Brotherhood's rhetoric, for instance by allowing Iranian warships to pass through the Suez Canal, closing down major American NGOs in Cairo, terminating gas sales to Israel and ending the Gaza blockade. Establishing a pluralist political system consisting of pro-capitalism parties, a Western-funded civil society and a corporate media would be the most efficient means to contain the army's influence in Egypt. Needless to say, the Brotherhood would also benefit from any such arrangement.

Only one thorny issue remains: relations with Israel. Yet, even here the difference is about appearance rather than substance. Mursi has repeatedly declared his intention to respect Egypt's international agreements, including the treaty with Israel. During the presidential campaign, some of his supporters went as far as to consider abiding by the treaty to be a religious obligation as long as Israel also respected it. Moreover, Mursi has been keen to avoid any discussion of the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), the most outstanding manifestation of economic normalisation with Israel. The Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv has not been recalled, and the Israeli flag is still flying in Cairo's skies. Most importantly, the Egyptian army, which according to the brethren is now under Mursi's full control, is coordinating its current campaign in Sinai with Israel.

The fact that Mursi wants to keep these positions off the radar to appease his domestic and regional constituencies is quite understandable; hence, his aides' frantic denial that he exchanged letters with his Israeli counterpart. But the Obama administration, for its own equally understandable reasons, also needs him to come out of the closet. Unfortunately for Mursi, his first visit to Washington will come shortly before the American presidential elections, meaning that the American-Egyptian-Israeli triangle will be a news item in the American media, at least for a few days.

Obama will probably encourage Mursi to be more open about his orientation, maybe by visiting a staunch pro-Israel institute as the Tunisian Al-Nahda Party leader Rachid Al-Ghannouchi did on his first visit to Washington after the Islamists' victory in Tunisia. Obama would appreciate such a gesture if for no other reason than to thwart Republican Party attacks that accuse him of letting down an erstwhile ally and of himself being a Muslim. This sounds like a fair price for the Obama administration's recognition of Mursi, despite the irregularities that marred the Egyptian elections, such as the repeated threats of violence if Mursi lost, his supporters' sectarian propaganda, and the prevention of Christians in some areas from voting. Furthermore, the administration did not protest against Mursi's assuming both the executive and legislative powers in Egypt, which flies in the face of the principle of checks and balances. So, will Mursi acquiesce, or will he hide behind a beard?

The United States courted the Brotherhood even before Mubarak's fall. But it takes two to tango. So far the Brotherhood has been happy to let America lead, while trying to create the impression, especially at home, that it is seeking new dance partners during four and 36-hour visits to Tehran and Beijing, respectively. Will it manage to keep up this image for long? It seems doubtful. Mursi's aides should make sure they pack his favourite dancing shoes, as all eyes will be turned on him when he makes his first appearance in Washington later this month.

The writer is a political analyst.

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Press review

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Sorry, I could not read the content fromt this page.

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Stepping up the money hunt

Hopes are high that a newly-formed national commission will be able to recover money smuggled abroad by members of the former Mubarak regime, writes Gamal Essam El-Din

Egypt's Islamist President Mohamed Mursi is about to issue a presidential decree to set up a national commission entrusted with recovering money smuggled outside Egypt by the family and cronies of ousted former president Hosni Mubarak.

The six-article decree states that the new commission will open an inquiry into all reports and lawsuits regarding money smuggled out of Egypt since 1992. A technical secretariat will be formed to take the measures necessary to trace the wealth of Mubarak, his family and henchmen.

"The secretariat will conduct negotiations with all international and regional organisations and foreign countries to gather as much information about Mubarak's wealth as possible," Article 2 of the decree says.

Article 5 states that the Ministry of Finance will open a special bank account at the Central Bank of Egypt for money recovered from abroad. Article 6 will make it obligatory for all state institutions to surrender the documents necessary for the commission to move forward.

Some sources put Mubarak's wealth at more than $70 billion, most of it in the UK and Switzerland. The fact that Mubarak's wife Suzanne is Anglo-Egyptian caused the family to invest most of its wealth in England, sources say. Legal experts in Egypt have lamented the fact that the British authorities are not helping in recovering money possessed by the Mubarak family in the UK.

The UK government announced this week that it was planning to send an expert to Egypt to help recover Mubarak's money. While UK Foreign Secretary William Hague once said that the UK was ready to offer all the help necessary to Egypt to recover the stolen money, his statement has never given rise to any concrete steps.

Hossam Eissa, a legal expert and member of the new commission, said "there should be adequate documented information about the money stolen and smuggled out of Egypt, so that European countries will assist in recovering this money."

Eissa criticised the UK for not doing enough to help Egypt in tracing the Mubarak family's illegal wealth in the UK. A report by the BBC this week indicated that the wealth of Mubarak's family in the UK was estimated at some 85 billion pounds sterling (about $135 billion) and that regime cronies also possess more than 15 billion pounds sterling in assets and personal accounts in the UK.

The report said a house owned by Gamal Mubarak in London's Knightsbridge district is estimated to be worth 10 million pounds sterling.

The wealth of the cronies of the former Mubarak regime has been the focus of public attention lately, when an investigative judge decided to place former presidential candidate and Mubarak's last prime minister Ahmed Shafik on a watch list on 29 August.

Shafik will be questioned over alleged corruption, notably by helping Mubarak's two sons Alaa and Gamal to obtain 40,000 metres of land near Ismailia at the low price of 70 piastres per metre. A complaint filed by Essam Sultan, a former parliamentary deputy and lawyer, alleged that Shafik had used his position as chair of the Association of Air Pilots in 1993 to sell Gamal and Alaa the land.

On Monday, the investigative judge, Osama El-Saidi, ordered that Nabil Shukri, former chair of the association, be placed in custody after he admitted being forced by Shafik to help Gamal and Alaa obtain the land.

Shafik's lawyer strongly denied that his client had been involved in corruption. Shafik, currently in Abu Dhabi, said "the charges levelled against me are politically motivated."

"An avalanche of accusations was directed at me after the end of the presidential elections, but this was no surprise due to the power of one party going after me," he said, referring to the Muslim Brotherhood, to which Shafik's opponent Mohamed Mursi, now Egypt's president, belongs.

Shafik's lawyer, Shawqi El-Sayed, said the complaints filed against Shafik were malicious and aimed at tarnishing his image. El-Sayed said Shafik had never been summoned for questioning and that his defence team should be informed of any charges against him.

Yehia Qadri, another of Shafik's lawyers, said that "Mubarak's two sons Gamal and Alaa bought the land from the board of the Association of the Air Pilots in 1990 and before Shafik was appointed its chairman in 1992." He said that "Shafik had just signed the purchase contract when Alaa and Gamal wanted to document it with the public notary."

Joining forces with Shafik, prominent sociologist Saadeddin Ibrahim said that "Islamist facism is out to get Shafik and all those who attacked the Muslim Brotherhood."

Closely related to the charges against Shafik are two complaints filed against Sami Anan, former military chief of staff and deputy chairman of the former ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Mohamed El-Tohami, former chair of the Administrative Control Authority (ACA).

Lawyer Samir Sabri has charged that Anan made a huge amount of money from houses and plots of land in the upscale Golf district east of Cairo. "Anan violated the law by obtaining two plots of land in the same district, the first estimated at 600 metres and the second at around 1,000 metres," Sabri said.

President Mursi awarded Anan the Medal of the Republic when he was sent into retirement on 12 August, leading some to think that Anan would be immune to subsequent investigation.

El-Tohami is accused of using his position between 2008 and 2012 to help businessmen and cronies of the former regime to avoid investigation or trial.

In his complaint, Moetasem Fathi, a former ACA officer, said "El-Tohami declined to give the prosecution authorities documents about the corruption of former Mubarak regime officials and helped fake documents so they could avoid persecution."

Eissa said "it is natural that the wealth of Mubarak and his cronies will remain a major public issue for some time. We have a lot of statements and documents about the wealth of the former regime to look into, but it will take a while to make sure these are soundly based."

"Some of the complaints filed against former regime officials could be motivated by revenge and a desire to settle accounts. For this reason, we have high hopes that the new commission will put the inquiries on the right track," he said.

On 29 August after a year-and-a-half of inquiries, the state-affiliated Illicit Gains Authority (IGA) decided to refer Safwat El-Sherif, Mubarak's long-time minister of information and secretary-general of the former ruling National Democratic Party, for trial on charges of profiteering and securing wealth estimated at LE300 million ($50 million) by illegal means.

The IGA said El-Sherif, also former chairman of the Shura Council, the upper house of the Egyptian parliament, and his two sons Ashraf and Ihab had illegally taken possession of 56 villas, chalets and plots of land.

It said that El-Sherif had built a mosque on a plot of land he owned illegally. The report added that El-Sherif's two sons had used their father's job as minister of information to build a media empire that was able to manipulate television satellite channels.

El-Sherif is currently facing trial on charges of masterminding attacks on peaceful protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square during the revolution. He is one of several former Mubarak regime officials to be under investigation, among them Fathi Sorour, former speaker of the People's Assembly, who faces charges of manslaughter and profiteering.

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Mayor of NJ's capital arrested in corruption probe

TRENTON, N.J. (AP) — Federal agents arrested the mayor of New Jersey's capital early Monday as part of a corruption investigation, alleging he agreed to accept bribes in connection with a proposed parking garage — actually a fake project created by authorities trying to capture him.

Trenton Mayor Tony Mack, his brother Ralphiel and convicted sex offender Joseph Giorgianni, a Mack supporter who owns a Trenton sandwich shop, were accused of conspiring to obstruct, delay and affect interstate commerce by extortion under color of official right.

Federal prosecutors alleged Mack agreed to use his influence in connection with a proposed parking garage in the city. The garage was made up — a fake project created by investigators to try to capture Mack, who has financial problems and attracted legal scrutiny since he took office.

U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman said at a news conference Monday that the city-owned land for the garage was assessed at $271,000. He said Mack and Giorgianni agreed to accept $100,000 for the land for the city coffers — as long as the purported developers paid a bribe of $100,000 to be split between the two alleged conspirators.

A federal magistrate Monday ordered Mack released on $150,000 bond but ruled that he cannot leave the state while free on bail. Mack's attorney would not comment on the case.

Federal agents began working with an informant to gather information on Mack and the others in September 2010, just two months after Mack took office. Fishman would not say when the investigation began or why.

Fishman said investigators quickly understood the relationship between the mayor and the sandwich shop owner: "It became clear he was a bagman for the mayor."

The defendants received $54,000 and anticipated accepting an additional $65,000 from a cooperating witness who purported to be a developer, according to court documents that laid out the sting.

The criminal complaint portrays Giorgianni as a boastful man who did most of the talking with two FBI informants — one who was cooperating to get a better deal in his own criminal case, another who was paid.

The sting was similar to the massive "Bid Rig" sting that resulted in criminal charges against 46 people — many of them local officials — in 2009. Then, bribes were attached to fictitious development projects. Prosecutors have had mixed success in winning convictions.

Giorgianni complained at one point that Mack, 46, could not take bribes because he was being watched so closely, the documents said. "It's sickening," he told one of the informants, according to the court papers.

"I like to make money for my friends," he said, according to the papers, and went on to reference infamously corrupt political boss William M. Tweed. "I like to do it like the Boss Tweed way. You know Boss Tweed ran Tammany Hall?"

He was also caught on tape telling one of the informants: "One thing about the Mack administration — when I say that, it's me and Mack — we're not greedy. We're corruptible. We want anybody to make a buck," and "I'm there to buffer the thing where, you know, take the weight ... going to jail's my business. It ain't his."

By contrast, when Mack was recorded, it was mostly just to say he'd meet someone or exchanging pleasantries. But in April, he was recorded at a meeting with Giorgianni and one of the informants saying: "I really appreciate what you guys have done for us. I appreciate your support and, like before, I support you and I'll keep on supporting you."

Authorities say, though, that the short-in-stature Mack, whom Giorgianni referred to as "Napoleon," was involved in the scheme. One piece of evidence they offer is that Giorgianni referred to money by code — calling it "Uncle Remus" — when he spoke with Mack, and that Mack seemed to know what he was saying.

The complaint also said that $2,500 in $100 bills with the serial numbers of those given to Giorgianni were found in a search of Ralphiel Mack's home in July.

Tony Mack was taken to an FBI office in Hamilton for processing and was driven into a secure area of the federal courthouse in Trenton at around 11 a.m. He was due in court later in the afternoon.

His administration has been in turmoil from Day 1, staggering from one crisis to another. A housecleaning of staff at City Hall opened the door for Mack's own appointees, who quickly turned it into a revolving door.

Under an agreement reached last year, the Democrat may hire department heads only from a pool of applicants the state offers or he risks losing $6 million in state aid.

Under state law, he would be forced out of office if he is convicted. But activists in Trenton would like to see him step down immediately. "If he were smart, he'd resign," said Jerell Blakely, a former campaign manager for Mack who is now a critic. Blakely predicted Mack would not step down on his own.

The mayor and his brother could each face 20 years in prison if convicted.

Giorgianni and eight others were charged separately Monday with a scheme to distribute oxycodone from the sandwich shop, and he was also charged with weapon possession by a convicted felon. He went to prison in the 1980s on charges of carnally abusing and debauching the morals of a 14-year-old girl in the back of his shop.

The case gained notoriety because of weight-related health problems that got Giorgianni, a steakhouse owner who once claimed to tip the scale at over 500 pounds, released and led a prosecutor to charge he "ate his way out of jail."

He faces up to 50 years in prison if he's convicted on all charges.

___

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Mursi beyond Tehran

In the Iranian capital and in Cairo, Dina Ezzat deciphers President Mursi's Iran visit, its intentions and possible outcomes Mursi (r)attended the NAM summit with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Iranian chief of Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran

"It is still early to talk about specifics regarding Egyptian-Iranian relations," said Yasser Ali, the Egyptian presidential spokesman.

Ali was speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly as President Mohamed Mursi was exiting the meeting room at the Tehran Conference Hall where he had conferred with his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for around 40 minutes, following the participation of both in the opening session of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran Thursday, whereby Mursi transferred the rotated presidency of the summit from Egypt to Iran.

According to Ali's statement to the Weekly and that of Ambassador Alaa Youssef, the head of Egypt's Interest Section in Iran, and of Ambassador Moatez Ahmadine, Egypt's permanent representative to the UN headquarters in New York, the venue of the NAM Secretariat, Mursi's brief visit to Tehran on his way back from Beijing was by and large multilateral with not much bilateral input.

"Of course, there were good exchanges of courteous statements and an emphasis by President Ahmadinejad on the respect that Iran has for Egypt and its great people, and its great [25 January] revolution. Of course Egyptian President Mursi, in turn, expressed respect for Iran and its history and its role, but we cannot say that bilateral relations were really discussed," commented an Iranian official who took part in the Mursi-Ahmadinejad encounter.

He added that eventually the time would come for that, because ultimately "what the two nations, these two great nations, have in common is much bigger than their differences."

The visit of Mursi to Tehran, which started late morning and ended early afternoon, is the first such high-level visit by an Egyptian official to Tehran after it severed its relations with Egypt in 1979 at a time of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, when refuge was offered by then Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat to Iran's ousted Shah, and against the backdrop of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Since that time, relations between Cairo and Tehran went from cold to hostile. Differences between the two countries grew with the time from mere political differences over the management of the Arab-Israeli struggle to differences over the Islamist rule of Iran versus relatively secular rule in Egypt, and of Sunni versus Shia leadership in the Middle East, especially during the years of war between Iran and Iraq, then under the leadership of president Saddam Hussein, in the late 1980s.

The visit of Mursi to Tehran this week, as head of the Egyptian delegation to the NAM summit, was hoped by many to signal the end of these differences and to initiate a new rapprochement that could eventually lead to the normalisation of relations -- something that was attempted by former foreign minister Amr Moussa under the rule of Hosni Mubarak in the late 1990s, but that he did not successfully pull off, according to Egyptian diplomats, due to Mubarak's hesitation and US influence over his foreign policy choices.

None of the aspired to change happened, according to almost identical accounts offered by Egyptian and Iranian officials, during Mursi's brief visit to Tehran. Rather the contrary could well be true, some officials say.

Mursi received huge media attention upon his arrival to Imam Khomeini International Airport and upon his departure from the Tehran Conference Hall. It is also true that Mursi referred to his Iranian counterpart as "my dear brother" during the opening of the summit. Following the visit of Mursi, the Iranian president also told the Iranian official press that, "Egyptians and Iranians have so much in common."

However, beyond this symbolism there is very little to be said in terms of substance on a positive outcome of Mursi's visit to Tehran from a bilateral perspective.

Mursi was not at all sensitive, in the assessment of Iranian individuals who spoke to the Weekly in Tehran, over Shia reluctance to the mention of some of the Prophet Mohamed's associates in his ultra-Islamic greeting at the beginning of what was otherwise a political speech in the opening of the NAM summit.

"May God's peace and prayers be upon the Prophet Mohamed and his sahabah (close associates) Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali and that of the Holy Family of the Prophet," Mursi said at the onset of his speech.

While the mention of the last, Ali and the Holy Family of the Prophet, falls squarely within the bounds of predominantly Shia Iran appreciation, the reference to the first three is all but a taboo according to the Shia sect.

According to one of Mursi's aides, the reference in its totality was designed to indicate the need to go beyond the barriers of division in Muslim history between those that Shias appreciate and those appreciated by Sunnis, the predominant Muslim sect in Egypt.

This might have been the intention, but Mursi's interlocutors were certainly offended. According to one Iranian official who asked not to be named, this introductory paragraph in the speech of Mursi acted as a reminder of statements that the Egyptian president had earlier made in Saudi Arabia where he spoke in an untypical fashion for an Egyptian head of state on Egyptian-Saudi determination to defend the Sunni sect.

According to an Egyptian diplomat who accompanied Mursi during the visit to Saudi Arabia in early July, that Sunni emphasis "came out of nowhere" and it was not introduced or advised by diplomatic aides to the president, nor had it ever been part of Egyptian political jargon.

"I remember back in 2004 when [ousted president] Mubarak made a reference in a TV interview to the attempt of Iranian Shias to get in alliance with the Shia majority in Iraq, the [Egyptian] Foreign Ministry strongly advised against this line. Egypt does not identify itself as a Sunni state but as a leading Arab Muslim state," the diplomat said.

The ultra-Muslim stance and specific Sunni identification that Mursi seemed to be proposing in his speech before NAM was not just offending to the Iranians. It was also perceived as unfortunate back home in Egypt.

"This is a really disturbing remark," suggested Amin Iskandar, a Nasserist politician and member of the Arab Affairs Committee in the dissolved People's Assembly.

"The introduction of Mursi's speech is not becoming of that of the president of Egypt. Why talk about Sunni versus Shia matters in the onset of a political speech before an international organisation? What was the purpose? Was Mursi trying to reposition Egypt as an Islamist state now?" asked Iskandar.

He added: "Egypt had never been trapped in the Sunni-Shia polarisation game and it should not be doing so today, and not ever, because that goes against its regional leadership interests and consequently against its national security interests."

For his part, prominent political scientist and commentator Amr El-Shobaki, who generally held a positive view of Mursi's trip to Iran, argued that the Sunni versus Shia component in the speech before NAM was uncalled for and unfortunate.

"Egypt is not a radical Sunni state; Egypt is a state of a very moderate Sunni majority that has an affinity to the Holy Family and has as such a very unique nature to its Sunni Islam. Egypt through Al-Azhar University has always played a leading role in bridging the gap between Sunnis and Shias and it should not be abandoning this crucial mission, which is not only religious but indeed cultural and strategic," El-Shobaki added.

If some were offended by the Sunni aspect in Mursi's speech, others were perturbed by what they qualified as the "Muslim Brotherhood policy line" they said Mursi put across in the speech.

"When the Egyptian president spoke against Damascus he was, I am afraid, reflecting his perspective as a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure and not as that of the president of what is supposed to be a leading Arab state," commented Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim, who headed the delegation of his country to the NAM summit.

In his speech, Mursi crossed borders he had personally embraced with regards to the Egyptian position on the Syrian file. Mursi used to speak of the need for the legitimate demands of the Syrian people for democratisation to be observed and for bloodshed to come to an end. In Tehran, the Egyptian president surprised his hosts, the closest regional allies to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, with an unprecedented attack on the Syrian regime for its actions during 18-month plus protests-turned-armed confrontations.

Mursi qualified the Al-Assad regime as an "oppressive regime" and insisted that it had "lost legitimacy". Indeed, the president equated the Syrian people under Al-Assad with the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.

"This was the talk of a member of the Muslim Brotherhood," restated Al-Muallim.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria are particularly active within the ranks of an otherwise diversified Syrian opposition that emerged in March 2011 demonstrations to end the rule of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot, that has headed Syria from the 1970s until today.

Iskandar too was critical of what he qualified as Muslim Brotherhood influence over the position that Mursi expressed with regards to Syria. "We are all appreciative of the legitimate and overdue demand of the Syrians for democracy. There are no two ways about it. However, it is impossible for anyone to equate the regime of Al-Assad, despite the horrid bloodshed in Syria, with the Israeli occupation of Palestine," Iskandar said.

According to Iskandar, "had Mursi been really concerned about the call for freedom and democracy he should have also made a reference to the call for democracy in Bahrain," where the Shia majority has for over a year been protesting against persecution at the hands of Sunni minority rule.

"For Mursi, it is not a matter of defending freedom but rather a matter of defending the Muslim Brotherhood perspective and associations," Iskandar suggested. He added that this line is compatible with the foreign policy agenda of Qatar, "that has an increasing influence over Egyptian foreign policy," adding that "Qatar is a regional proxy for the US."

During his visit to Tehran, President Mursi had a brief encounter with the emir of Qatar who had just visited Egypt mid-August. "The Qataris are opposed to the regime of Al-Assad, but not to the persecution of Shia in Bahrain, and Mursi spoke about Syria under the pretext of defending freedoms but completely dropped Bahrain," Iskandar criticised.

Indeed, the Iranian interpreter who was translating Mursi's speech into Persian was said, according to Iranian journalists, to have played around with his translation. In converting Mursi's speech into Persian, the Iranian interpreter pinned the attack made by the Egyptian president on the Bahraini rather than the Syrian regime.

Nonetheless, many Egyptian politicians and commentators had a positive reaction to Mursi's statements on Syria. "It was an overdue support," El-Shobaki said.

According to El-Shobaki, it is reductionist to suggest that the Egyptian position expressed by Mursi in Tehran is an outcome of Qatari influence over Egyptian foreign policy. "This is absolutely exaggerated," he said. El-Shobaki made reference to the criticism that the majority of Egyptian political quarters expressed against what they qualified as Mursi's "hesitant and flat positions on Syria".

"In Tehran, the president should have acknowledged the Bahraini call for democracy, but his failure to do so does not mean that he should have also overlooked a very bloody situation in Syria, especially that the support for the Syrian revolution is widely sensed not just in Egyptian political circles but indeed in the Egyptian street," El-Shobaki suggested.

According to Amr Ramadan, deputy assistant foreign minister, Mursi had already called for a political end to the crisis in Syria. During his participation in the extraordinary summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held two weeks ago in Mecca, at the invitation of the Saudi monarch, Mursi called for the launch of a working group of the OIC to help find resolution to the situation in Syria.

In Tehran, on Thursday, and Friday when the summit closed, Ramadan added, Egypt was supportive of a resolution that the NAM meeting adopted to welcome the mission of the new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi.

"What we opposed was an Iranian proposal to start a NAM working group on Syria, and our rationale there was simple: there are already several mechanisms and what is needed now is the coordination of efforts rather than the launch of a parallel mediation process," Ramadan suggested.

At the end of the day, both Ramadan and El-Shobaki agree that what Mursi did in essence with his remarks in Syria during the NAM summit was to substantiate Egypt's commitment to take a clear stance on the matter.

Indeed, in the analysis of El-Shobaki, the clear outcome of the Mursi visit to Tehran is the re-launching of Egyptian foreign policy.

Mursi in his speech also departed from the traditional reconciliatory line that Egypt had for the past 10 years embraced on the Palestinian cause. The president voiced direct and untypical criticism of Israel and highlighted previously overlooked matters, like the fate of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.

"This file is a crucial matter on the agenda of NAM. It had received much attention during the Egyptian presidency of the NAM summit and it is recommended as a priority issue in the transfer report that Egypt made during the handover of the presidency of the summit," Ramadan argued.

Moreover, the NAM summit made a commitment to support the diplomatic and political attempts to get Palestine permanent and full membership in the UN, in view of the failure of the so-called "peace process" to lead to a Palestinian state.

"Of course this mobilisation, in which Egypt is playing a key role, is not at all to the liking of the Israelis and they are endlessly complaining about it," the same diplomat suggested.

Egyptian diplomats who spoke on condition of anonymity said that the mere participation of Mursi in a Tehran-hosted summit is in itself a clear message to Israel that Egypt is no longer hostage to what makes Israel comfortable or not.

"We were told clearly that the Israelis are feeling very apprehensive about this visit, even when they knew that it was not designed to re-launch diplomatic relations immediately," said one diplomat.

Alarm against Mursi's visit to Tehran was sounded also in Washington. "There was much pressure, but it was declined," the same diplomat added.

According to Ramadan, the decision of Egypt to participate at this high level was made in view of the reclaimed attention that Egypt is giving to its role in the Third World.

"In a sense, the decision was made irrespective of the venue of the summit. NAM might not be making as much commotion as it used to during the heydays when it was first launched with the support, and indeed initiative, of [late president Gamal] Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s, but ultimately it is a grouping that brings together about two thirds of UN member states," Ramadan said.

He added that the issues on the agenda of NAM, which range from international conflicts to disarmament and economic and environmental cooperation, fall squarely within the list of priorities of Egyptian foreign policy.

And the fact that Mursi went to Tehran, El-Shobaki argued, opens a new phase of Egyptian foreign policy by which Egypt would not restrict itself to communication with the countries it sees eye-to-eye with.

"The president went to Tehran in a positive sign of goodwill. But while there he did not shy away from expressing disagreements between Cairo and Tehran. This is the way things should be," El-Shobaki said.

The shaking and remaking of Egyptian foreign policy seems to be a priority for Mursi. The president, who repeatedly committed to observe the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and who is as yet acting in line with the close alliance between Cairo and Washington, is venturing into a wider spectrum and a more diversified sphere of communication.

Ahead of his short and controversial visit to Tehran, Mursi had been in Beijing. For October, he is planning visits to Malaysia and Indonesia, whose vice president he met while in Tehran. He is also considering a trip to Brazil and Chile, which will possibly come in the wake of his visit to New York during the last week of this month to head the Egyptian delegation to the UN General Assembly.

The South America and Asian trips are in parallel with plans to visit European capitals that Egypt keeps in close relation with.

"If Egypt is aiming to reassume its leadership it needs to take clear positions on key matters and to widen its scope of foreign policy engagement. I think Mursi is attempting to do both," El-Shobaki concluded.

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Dangerous to freedom

A ministerial decree to amend the current emergency law has been rejected outright, Mona El-Nahhas reports

Nakhnoukh is a name that may be on everyone's lips these days, but it was a familiar name to many even before his arrest. He was known as "The Muallim" (master) to those in his employ and as "The General" in hooligan circles, he introduced himself to the prosecutor-general's office as the owner of a private security firm and chairman of the board of directors of the Sawt Al-Dawla (Voice of the Nation) newspaper. In fact, the newspaper was more in the nature of his own mouthpiece, for he was the hidden voice of the former regime who, according to leaks from persons close to him, was the man who took charge of those difficult tasks that the regime needed done when it came to parliamentary elections and shady land deals. He was the stick that was brought down on those who refused to cooperate.

He had built up a small empire and wielded his sceptre from a villa in King Mariout gated community on the outskirts of Alexandria. He displayed his power and status in the types of animals he purchased, his evening revelries, and his personal discotheque in his villa compound. The shadier side of his life has begun to emerge during the investigations in the prosecutor-general's office in Alexandria. A general picture is taking shape and we can expect further details from the hearings of his trial, now that prosecutor-general Ibrahim El-Halbawi has arraigned him on charges of thuggery, possession of drugs and unlicensed arms, possession of devices enabling him to make international phone calls, possession of beasts of prey without a licence and facilitating prostitution. At the same time, the Alexandria Court of Appeals prosecutors office and the office of the deputy prosecutor-general in Cairo are coordinating in investigations into Nakhnoukh's relationship with the former regime and, specifically, his involvement in the violence that erupted shortly after the January Revolution began. On this aspect of "The General's" darker side, Mohamed El-Beltagui of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership described Nakhnoukh, in a television talk show, as the commander of the National Democratic Party's secret organisation which engineered parliamentary elections and organised violence.

In his deposition before the prosecution-general, Nakhnoukh was cool and systematic in his denial of the allegations. He said that he had licences for the weapons that were confiscated from his home, as well as for the lions and dogs he possessed. He stated that he had purchased the lions 13 years ago, and that he has no knowledge of the automated weapons that were mentioned in the charges. He also made it clear that he had not been present at the villa for 10 consecutive months because he had been in Lebanon on what he described as a combination of business trip and holiday from 20 December to 18 August. His lawyers explained that MB leader El-Beltagui instigated Nakhnoukh's arrest through inflammatory remarks in a television talk show. They submitted a recording of that programme on Nakhnoukh's mobile phone as proof that Muslim Brotherhood "incitement" was the sole reason for his arrest, adding that Nakhnoukh travels regularly outside the country and that when he last returned to Egypt through Cairo International Airport there were no pending cases that would have caused him to be detained at the airport.

The lawyers argued that the case being brought against Nakhnoukh was no more than a vendetta being waged by the Muslim Brotherhood in revenge for his having been a supporter of the former regime. They maintain that no specific names were mentioned in connection with the allegations in this regard and that the same applied with regard to the charge of "facilitating prostitution" in artistic circles.

Although hashish was found and served as the basis of the allegation of drug dealing, Nakhnoukh claims that they were solely for his personal consumption. "There is no evidence whatsoever that I ever was involved in drug trafficking," he said. With regard to the other vice charge, he said, "I know only one of the women that were mentioned and she is the wife of my assistant. I do not know any of the other girls. They came to the villa because they know that I have good relations with performers and producers and they hoped I would introduce them to someone who would help them in their acting careers." Although there had been women in his villa on the evening before his arrest, he claims that he had been asleep at the time and that he had never seen them before the morning of the day he was arrested. The 46-year-old Sabri Nakhnoukh is unmarried, but says that he had just become engaged during his last visit to Lebanon. Among the papers the prosecutor-general's office found in his home were a weapon's licence issued in his name from Lebanon and a letter stating that he worked as a media advisor to the embassy of Uzbekistan in Egypt.

During the first hearing in Alexandria, the alleged thug baron claimed that the reason for his arrest was his disputes with the current heads of the Ministry of Interior. When asked about the nature of these disputes, he said that he had cooperated with the former regime which availed itself of his services during parliamentary elections.

During the second hearing, Nakhnoukh was accused of having met with the former minister of interior in 2005, just before the parliamentary elections were held that year. In that meeting, Nakhnoukh was allegedly asked to organise thugs to man the polling stations in order to keep out NDP voters. He was also accused of being involved in vote purchasing and in pro-regime violence following the revolution. Nakhnoukh denied his relationship with the former regime and any of its chief figures, contrary to the purported "leaks" to the press.

CONFISCATED ITEMS: Among the prosecution-general hearings with Nakhnoukh, two sessions were held in the prosecutor-general's department in the Alexandrian area of Al-Amiriya. These sessions focussed on items that were in his possession and persons in his company at the time of his arrest. One item was a Glock handgun licensed to the owner from Dokki police station in Egypt. In his company were 12 persons, listed as dangerous and having a criminal record. Four women were also there.

As for the items the officers seized from inside the villa, they included a 39 calibre rifle, seven safes, bullets, three holsters, a rifle "suspected to be an antique", four electric shock batons, a bulletproof vest, four large knives and three Motorola walkie-talkies. In addition, there was hashish; LE56,995, $3,060, and 4,000 Lebanese lira; 16 mobile phones, six wrist watches of various makes and a pair of night-vision goggles; and finally three bottles of alcohol and some gold jewellery.

Outside the villa, the prosecution noted five cars, five lions in locked iron cages, six predatory dogs, four horses, an ostrich and various domesticated animals.

More details should be forthcoming in the coming days, as the investigation continues in this case which has riveted public attention in Egypt due to the accused's shady connections with the former regime and his alleged involvement in electoral rigging and organised violence against demonstrators.

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MPLA preponderates

Buttressed by its landslide victory, Angola's ruling party must act now with a new mandate to bolster confidence among the country's youth, contends Gamal Nkrumah A man looks at a copy of the ballot poster at the entrance of a polling station in the Angolan capital Luanda during national elections

Wherever he goes Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos, Africa's leading Communist capitalist cannot escape the question. When will the trickle-down effect impact the poorest of the poor in the third largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa after South Africa and Nigeria -- except that South Africa has a population of 50 million and Nigeria a population of 170 million while Angola only has 20 million. With two-digit economic growth rates over the past decade half of the Angolan population lives below the poverty line.

The United Nations Human Development Index ranks Angola 148th out of 187 countries -- a paradoxically poor performance for one of Africa's wealthiest countries, one blessed with minerals galore, oil and natural gas, and tremendous agricultural potential.

Dos Santos understands that Angola is on course to become an African energy superpower, and the rejuvenation of Angola's capital city and other urban centres is a hopeful sign that the scars of the three decades long civil war are fast healing. Moreover, Angola long involved militarily in its northern neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo's civil war, has long pulled out of the Congolese imbroglio.

Angola's National Electoral Commission declared the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (better known by its Portuguese acronym MPLA) as having won a landslide victory of 72 per cent. Its onetime arch rival the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) scooped barely 19 per cent, almost doubling its 2008 tally. UNITA never survived the crushing blow of the assassination of its charismatic leader Jonas Savimbi, an ethnic Ovimbundu, in 2002.

The newly formed political party, the Salvation Electoral Commission CASA-CE trailed behind as a poor third with no more than six per cent. Predictably enough, what the Angolan media played down was that the turnout was down from 80 per cent during the last general elections in 2008 to 60 per cent last week.

"We will not allow a fraud to take place and we will not recognise the legitimacy of any government resulting from elections held outside the law," UNITA's leader Isaias Samakura ominously cautioned before the elections. The turnout in the Angolan capital Luanda, traditionally an MPLA stronghold, was less than 50 per cent. Meanwhile, the MPLA's campaign cost $70 million -- a substantial sum by African standards. UNITA, CASA-CE and civil society groups filed complaints and threatened a legal challenge.

Even now with Savimbi long dead, the doubters are asking many questions, a number of them reasonable enough, about the pace and process of multi-party democracy in Angola.

With its fabulous wealth the country, and the ruling party, do not want to be remembered as one of the wretchedly brief experiments in half-baked African democracies. The restless youth seem determined to run their own affairs, whatever the MPLA government may say. Dos Santos insists that Angola at least is heading in the right direction.

Angolans must be given the chance to disprove these prejudices against African democracy. The MPLA's role model appears to be South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC) -- a party that has monopolised power since the end of apartheid on 1994. Both South Africa's ANC and Angola's MPLA claim to be parties of the left -- in the MPLA's case it is avowedly a party with Marxist roots.

What was once Angola's Achilles heel is becoming a competitive advantage. The country was depopulated in the course of five centuries by Portuguese slave traders shipping hapless Angolans to Brazil primarily and South America more generally.

Next, the Portuguese instituted one of the most brutish colonial regimes on the African continent with ruthless exploitation of the peasantry and indentured labour. The Portuguese colonialists deliberately foisted tribal divisions and encouraged ethnic and tribal identities in a most ruinous divide and rule policy.

Angola's low population density has now become a decisive advantage. Still, Angola's ramshackle public services desperately need upgrading. The country has one of the highest rates of disabled people as direct result of the calamitous civil war that claimed the lives of countless Angolans. Dilapidated roads hamper rural development. It is against this grim backdrop that social tensions are brewing.

The Angolan capital Luanda has been home to the largest population of mixed race, or Mestizos residents in Africa, and they formed the basis of the MPLA to begin with. The Mestizos provided the bulk of the early nationalist, anti-colonial leaders and rank and file of the MPLA. Angola's late first president Augustino Neto and the current leader Eduardo dos Santos hail from the Mestizo community.

The MPLA has not yet quite shaken off that particular legacy yet, much to the chagrin of the Bantu groups, numerically far superior, such as the Ovimbundu, the country's most populous ethnic group, the closely related Mbundu and the Bakongo. Tribalism inevitably aggravates inequality, and political tribalism has played a dangerous, destructive and disgraceful role in Angolan politics.

The butchery was unsparing. The Angolan civil war ended exactly a decade ago in 2002. And, even as the MPLA attempts to attract a bigger following by staging musical festivals and carnivals where music blares and beer flows, anti-MPLA hip-hop blasting from the speakers of Luanda's candongeiros -- local dance halls. And, not to be outdone, the gangsters, or gatunos (criminals), and jobless youths wreaking havoc in the sprawling shantytowns surrounding Luanda deface the natural beauty and exuberance of the Angolan environment and its people.

None of this is an excuse for failing to act or stifling criticism. In Angola, like in South Africa, there is no time for tribalism. But there are serious differences between the ANC and the MPLA.

Angola urgently needs a more diversified economy. Strong energy revenues have not benefited the most disadvantaged groups of Angolans. South Africa's domestic market could form a solid foundation for its manufacturers to become exporters, reducing its dependence on minerals and agricultural produce. There is a fair amount of industry left in post-apartheid South Africa and that has prospects of competing in the regional, continental and international markets. Angola is bound to rely on energy and minerals for its economic growth and prosperity.

This is the root of it all -- slavery, colonialism and civil war. One of the under-appreciated trends is the rich musical tradition that gives the country its special character. The country is famous for its Kizomba dance and musical style with soft melodies to match the fast-paced Kuduru Techno-House music unique to Angola. Kizomba, Angola's answer to Argentina's Tango is a derivative of Semba, the traditional seductive Bantu "touch of the bellies" dance.

Kazutuka, Kabetula are Congolese, or Bakongo-style dances from northern Angola and the Rebita dance, like Kizomba is danced to songs with Portuguese lyrics. Kilapanda and Angolan Merengue stir the spirit of the nation. Angola's rich cultural heritage lends it a unique place in Africa and the Lusophone world.

If only. There is also the current trend of corruption in high places. And, the spectre of tribalism and ethnic strife haunts the sprawling country. The Ambundu, or northern Mbundu, who constitute around a quarter of the population of the country rival the southern Mbundu, or Ovimbundu, Angola's largest ethnic group constituting around 40 per cent of the total population of the country. The Bakongo in the far north are the third largest ethnic group with slightly less than 15 per cent of the Angolan population.

From its Marxist beginnings, the MPLA today appears as a plutocratic party of the prosperous top echelons of government and the inner circle of Dos Santos and well-to-do family members and high-ranking officials. Cranes and cement-mixers toil relentlessly in the fast-expanding Angolan capital. And Angolans have largely put down their guns to dance and enjoy their spectacular beaches.

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