‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Mursi. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات Mursi. إظهار كافة الرسائل

الجمعة، 28 سبتمبر 2012

Mursi beyond Tehran

In the Iranian capital and in Cairo, Dina Ezzat deciphers President Mursi's Iran visit, its intentions and possible outcomes Mursi (r)attended the NAM summit with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Iranian chief of Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran

"It is still early to talk about specifics regarding Egyptian-Iranian relations," said Yasser Ali, the Egyptian presidential spokesman.

Ali was speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly as President Mohamed Mursi was exiting the meeting room at the Tehran Conference Hall where he had conferred with his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for around 40 minutes, following the participation of both in the opening session of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran Thursday, whereby Mursi transferred the rotated presidency of the summit from Egypt to Iran.

According to Ali's statement to the Weekly and that of Ambassador Alaa Youssef, the head of Egypt's Interest Section in Iran, and of Ambassador Moatez Ahmadine, Egypt's permanent representative to the UN headquarters in New York, the venue of the NAM Secretariat, Mursi's brief visit to Tehran on his way back from Beijing was by and large multilateral with not much bilateral input.

"Of course, there were good exchanges of courteous statements and an emphasis by President Ahmadinejad on the respect that Iran has for Egypt and its great people, and its great [25 January] revolution. Of course Egyptian President Mursi, in turn, expressed respect for Iran and its history and its role, but we cannot say that bilateral relations were really discussed," commented an Iranian official who took part in the Mursi-Ahmadinejad encounter.

He added that eventually the time would come for that, because ultimately "what the two nations, these two great nations, have in common is much bigger than their differences."

The visit of Mursi to Tehran, which started late morning and ended early afternoon, is the first such high-level visit by an Egyptian official to Tehran after it severed its relations with Egypt in 1979 at a time of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, when refuge was offered by then Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat to Iran's ousted Shah, and against the backdrop of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Since that time, relations between Cairo and Tehran went from cold to hostile. Differences between the two countries grew with the time from mere political differences over the management of the Arab-Israeli struggle to differences over the Islamist rule of Iran versus relatively secular rule in Egypt, and of Sunni versus Shia leadership in the Middle East, especially during the years of war between Iran and Iraq, then under the leadership of president Saddam Hussein, in the late 1980s.

The visit of Mursi to Tehran this week, as head of the Egyptian delegation to the NAM summit, was hoped by many to signal the end of these differences and to initiate a new rapprochement that could eventually lead to the normalisation of relations -- something that was attempted by former foreign minister Amr Moussa under the rule of Hosni Mubarak in the late 1990s, but that he did not successfully pull off, according to Egyptian diplomats, due to Mubarak's hesitation and US influence over his foreign policy choices.

None of the aspired to change happened, according to almost identical accounts offered by Egyptian and Iranian officials, during Mursi's brief visit to Tehran. Rather the contrary could well be true, some officials say.

Mursi received huge media attention upon his arrival to Imam Khomeini International Airport and upon his departure from the Tehran Conference Hall. It is also true that Mursi referred to his Iranian counterpart as "my dear brother" during the opening of the summit. Following the visit of Mursi, the Iranian president also told the Iranian official press that, "Egyptians and Iranians have so much in common."

However, beyond this symbolism there is very little to be said in terms of substance on a positive outcome of Mursi's visit to Tehran from a bilateral perspective.

Mursi was not at all sensitive, in the assessment of Iranian individuals who spoke to the Weekly in Tehran, over Shia reluctance to the mention of some of the Prophet Mohamed's associates in his ultra-Islamic greeting at the beginning of what was otherwise a political speech in the opening of the NAM summit.

"May God's peace and prayers be upon the Prophet Mohamed and his sahabah (close associates) Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali and that of the Holy Family of the Prophet," Mursi said at the onset of his speech.

While the mention of the last, Ali and the Holy Family of the Prophet, falls squarely within the bounds of predominantly Shia Iran appreciation, the reference to the first three is all but a taboo according to the Shia sect.

According to one of Mursi's aides, the reference in its totality was designed to indicate the need to go beyond the barriers of division in Muslim history between those that Shias appreciate and those appreciated by Sunnis, the predominant Muslim sect in Egypt.

This might have been the intention, but Mursi's interlocutors were certainly offended. According to one Iranian official who asked not to be named, this introductory paragraph in the speech of Mursi acted as a reminder of statements that the Egyptian president had earlier made in Saudi Arabia where he spoke in an untypical fashion for an Egyptian head of state on Egyptian-Saudi determination to defend the Sunni sect.

According to an Egyptian diplomat who accompanied Mursi during the visit to Saudi Arabia in early July, that Sunni emphasis "came out of nowhere" and it was not introduced or advised by diplomatic aides to the president, nor had it ever been part of Egyptian political jargon.

"I remember back in 2004 when [ousted president] Mubarak made a reference in a TV interview to the attempt of Iranian Shias to get in alliance with the Shia majority in Iraq, the [Egyptian] Foreign Ministry strongly advised against this line. Egypt does not identify itself as a Sunni state but as a leading Arab Muslim state," the diplomat said.

The ultra-Muslim stance and specific Sunni identification that Mursi seemed to be proposing in his speech before NAM was not just offending to the Iranians. It was also perceived as unfortunate back home in Egypt.

"This is a really disturbing remark," suggested Amin Iskandar, a Nasserist politician and member of the Arab Affairs Committee in the dissolved People's Assembly.

"The introduction of Mursi's speech is not becoming of that of the president of Egypt. Why talk about Sunni versus Shia matters in the onset of a political speech before an international organisation? What was the purpose? Was Mursi trying to reposition Egypt as an Islamist state now?" asked Iskandar.

He added: "Egypt had never been trapped in the Sunni-Shia polarisation game and it should not be doing so today, and not ever, because that goes against its regional leadership interests and consequently against its national security interests."

For his part, prominent political scientist and commentator Amr El-Shobaki, who generally held a positive view of Mursi's trip to Iran, argued that the Sunni versus Shia component in the speech before NAM was uncalled for and unfortunate.

"Egypt is not a radical Sunni state; Egypt is a state of a very moderate Sunni majority that has an affinity to the Holy Family and has as such a very unique nature to its Sunni Islam. Egypt through Al-Azhar University has always played a leading role in bridging the gap between Sunnis and Shias and it should not be abandoning this crucial mission, which is not only religious but indeed cultural and strategic," El-Shobaki added.

If some were offended by the Sunni aspect in Mursi's speech, others were perturbed by what they qualified as the "Muslim Brotherhood policy line" they said Mursi put across in the speech.

"When the Egyptian president spoke against Damascus he was, I am afraid, reflecting his perspective as a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure and not as that of the president of what is supposed to be a leading Arab state," commented Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim, who headed the delegation of his country to the NAM summit.

In his speech, Mursi crossed borders he had personally embraced with regards to the Egyptian position on the Syrian file. Mursi used to speak of the need for the legitimate demands of the Syrian people for democratisation to be observed and for bloodshed to come to an end. In Tehran, the Egyptian president surprised his hosts, the closest regional allies to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, with an unprecedented attack on the Syrian regime for its actions during 18-month plus protests-turned-armed confrontations.

Mursi qualified the Al-Assad regime as an "oppressive regime" and insisted that it had "lost legitimacy". Indeed, the president equated the Syrian people under Al-Assad with the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.

"This was the talk of a member of the Muslim Brotherhood," restated Al-Muallim.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria are particularly active within the ranks of an otherwise diversified Syrian opposition that emerged in March 2011 demonstrations to end the rule of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot, that has headed Syria from the 1970s until today.

Iskandar too was critical of what he qualified as Muslim Brotherhood influence over the position that Mursi expressed with regards to Syria. "We are all appreciative of the legitimate and overdue demand of the Syrians for democracy. There are no two ways about it. However, it is impossible for anyone to equate the regime of Al-Assad, despite the horrid bloodshed in Syria, with the Israeli occupation of Palestine," Iskandar said.

According to Iskandar, "had Mursi been really concerned about the call for freedom and democracy he should have also made a reference to the call for democracy in Bahrain," where the Shia majority has for over a year been protesting against persecution at the hands of Sunni minority rule.

"For Mursi, it is not a matter of defending freedom but rather a matter of defending the Muslim Brotherhood perspective and associations," Iskandar suggested. He added that this line is compatible with the foreign policy agenda of Qatar, "that has an increasing influence over Egyptian foreign policy," adding that "Qatar is a regional proxy for the US."

During his visit to Tehran, President Mursi had a brief encounter with the emir of Qatar who had just visited Egypt mid-August. "The Qataris are opposed to the regime of Al-Assad, but not to the persecution of Shia in Bahrain, and Mursi spoke about Syria under the pretext of defending freedoms but completely dropped Bahrain," Iskandar criticised.

Indeed, the Iranian interpreter who was translating Mursi's speech into Persian was said, according to Iranian journalists, to have played around with his translation. In converting Mursi's speech into Persian, the Iranian interpreter pinned the attack made by the Egyptian president on the Bahraini rather than the Syrian regime.

Nonetheless, many Egyptian politicians and commentators had a positive reaction to Mursi's statements on Syria. "It was an overdue support," El-Shobaki said.

According to El-Shobaki, it is reductionist to suggest that the Egyptian position expressed by Mursi in Tehran is an outcome of Qatari influence over Egyptian foreign policy. "This is absolutely exaggerated," he said. El-Shobaki made reference to the criticism that the majority of Egyptian political quarters expressed against what they qualified as Mursi's "hesitant and flat positions on Syria".

"In Tehran, the president should have acknowledged the Bahraini call for democracy, but his failure to do so does not mean that he should have also overlooked a very bloody situation in Syria, especially that the support for the Syrian revolution is widely sensed not just in Egyptian political circles but indeed in the Egyptian street," El-Shobaki suggested.

According to Amr Ramadan, deputy assistant foreign minister, Mursi had already called for a political end to the crisis in Syria. During his participation in the extraordinary summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held two weeks ago in Mecca, at the invitation of the Saudi monarch, Mursi called for the launch of a working group of the OIC to help find resolution to the situation in Syria.

In Tehran, on Thursday, and Friday when the summit closed, Ramadan added, Egypt was supportive of a resolution that the NAM meeting adopted to welcome the mission of the new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi.

"What we opposed was an Iranian proposal to start a NAM working group on Syria, and our rationale there was simple: there are already several mechanisms and what is needed now is the coordination of efforts rather than the launch of a parallel mediation process," Ramadan suggested.

At the end of the day, both Ramadan and El-Shobaki agree that what Mursi did in essence with his remarks in Syria during the NAM summit was to substantiate Egypt's commitment to take a clear stance on the matter.

Indeed, in the analysis of El-Shobaki, the clear outcome of the Mursi visit to Tehran is the re-launching of Egyptian foreign policy.

Mursi in his speech also departed from the traditional reconciliatory line that Egypt had for the past 10 years embraced on the Palestinian cause. The president voiced direct and untypical criticism of Israel and highlighted previously overlooked matters, like the fate of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.

"This file is a crucial matter on the agenda of NAM. It had received much attention during the Egyptian presidency of the NAM summit and it is recommended as a priority issue in the transfer report that Egypt made during the handover of the presidency of the summit," Ramadan argued.

Moreover, the NAM summit made a commitment to support the diplomatic and political attempts to get Palestine permanent and full membership in the UN, in view of the failure of the so-called "peace process" to lead to a Palestinian state.

"Of course this mobilisation, in which Egypt is playing a key role, is not at all to the liking of the Israelis and they are endlessly complaining about it," the same diplomat suggested.

Egyptian diplomats who spoke on condition of anonymity said that the mere participation of Mursi in a Tehran-hosted summit is in itself a clear message to Israel that Egypt is no longer hostage to what makes Israel comfortable or not.

"We were told clearly that the Israelis are feeling very apprehensive about this visit, even when they knew that it was not designed to re-launch diplomatic relations immediately," said one diplomat.

Alarm against Mursi's visit to Tehran was sounded also in Washington. "There was much pressure, but it was declined," the same diplomat added.

According to Ramadan, the decision of Egypt to participate at this high level was made in view of the reclaimed attention that Egypt is giving to its role in the Third World.

"In a sense, the decision was made irrespective of the venue of the summit. NAM might not be making as much commotion as it used to during the heydays when it was first launched with the support, and indeed initiative, of [late president Gamal] Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s, but ultimately it is a grouping that brings together about two thirds of UN member states," Ramadan said.

He added that the issues on the agenda of NAM, which range from international conflicts to disarmament and economic and environmental cooperation, fall squarely within the list of priorities of Egyptian foreign policy.

And the fact that Mursi went to Tehran, El-Shobaki argued, opens a new phase of Egyptian foreign policy by which Egypt would not restrict itself to communication with the countries it sees eye-to-eye with.

"The president went to Tehran in a positive sign of goodwill. But while there he did not shy away from expressing disagreements between Cairo and Tehran. This is the way things should be," El-Shobaki said.

The shaking and remaking of Egyptian foreign policy seems to be a priority for Mursi. The president, who repeatedly committed to observe the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and who is as yet acting in line with the close alliance between Cairo and Washington, is venturing into a wider spectrum and a more diversified sphere of communication.

Ahead of his short and controversial visit to Tehran, Mursi had been in Beijing. For October, he is planning visits to Malaysia and Indonesia, whose vice president he met while in Tehran. He is also considering a trip to Brazil and Chile, which will possibly come in the wake of his visit to New York during the last week of this month to head the Egyptian delegation to the UN General Assembly.

The South America and Asian trips are in parallel with plans to visit European capitals that Egypt keeps in close relation with.

"If Egypt is aiming to reassume its leadership it needs to take clear positions on key matters and to widen its scope of foreign policy engagement. I think Mursi is attempting to do both," El-Shobaki concluded.


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الأحد، 9 سبتمبر 2012

Mursi stands up

Four weeks ago, the assumption was that the military would oust the newly elected president, but this week that same president removed the generals, reports Dina Ezzat

This week, Mohamed Mursi, Egypt's first freely elected head of state, acted against the generals making up the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in week six of his presidency. Mursi, also the country's first ever civilian president, comes from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and took power on 30 June following a narrow electoral victory against one of the former aides of ousted president Hosni Mubarak.

During his first days in office, Mursi was considered both inside and outside Egypt to be a weak president who might not make it through his four years in office. Having entered the presidential elections as the Muslim Brotherhood's second choice, its first choice having been disqualified for legal reasons, Mursi was seen by many as the man elected to ward off Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak's last prime minister, and prevent what would otherwise have been a defeat for the 25 January Revolution.

Mursi was seen as a man walking in the shadow of the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Badie, to whom every member of the group owes loyalty, the Brotherhood's deputy supreme guide, Khairat El-Shater, its original candidate for president, and Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, Mubarak's former minister of defence, who refused to use the military against the demonstrators during the 25 January Revolution.

Tantawi had been running the country as head of the SCAF until power was transferred to the civilian president. However, this did not take place until the military had issued a "constitutional declaration" perceived across the political spectrum as limiting Mursi's power.

Before taking the presidential oath of office, Mursi officially resigned from the Muslim Brotherhood and from its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, which he had previously headed. In theory, this meant breaking his oath of loyalty to Badie, even if, as sources in the presidency and the Brotherhood have told Al-Ahram Weekly, Mursi still keeps in direct and indirect touch with Badie.

As for El-Shater, who had appeared with Mursi during the first days of the presidential campaign, he disappeared half-way through the election process, it being "Mursi who had asked the supreme guide to ask El-Shater to stay away, because he was offended at being called the 'Brotherhood's spare tyre,'" said a source from the group.

Once Mursi was in office, El-Shater disappeared, yet "the key members of Mursi's presidential campaign and of his current presidential team are originally from the campaign of El-Shater," commented a former member of the Brotherhood. Mursi and El-Shater keep in touch through these aides, and "when El-Shater went on a tour that included some Arab and Asian countries recently to try and attract investment to Egypt, he kept Mursi in the loop about his contacts and was supported with information from Mursi's office," he added.

In week three of his presidency, which should last four years according to the Constitutional Declaration issued by the SCAF in March last year, Mursi attempted to sideline Tantawi by issuing a decree calling for the parliament, dissolved in June by decree of the constitutional court, to reassemble. However, on this occasion the parliament only briefly reassembled, and "many of us thought that Mursi and the Brotherhood were not ready for a fight with the SCAF," one retired military source said. "Though it turned out that he was only waiting to attack again."

On Sunday, Mursi did attack, when the president, who had never really been accorded the treatment due to the country's military commander-in-chief, issued a decree ordering the retirement of Tantawi and the SCAF's second-in-command, Sami Anan. The two generals obeyed the decree, and they have accepted to act as advisors to the president.

The decree came against the backdrop of considerable disagreement between the two men, especially in relation to the management of the Rafah crisis following the killing of 16 Egyptian border guards while they were on duty on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip and Israel earlier this month. It also came following a presidential decree to remove the head of intelligence and several military generals.

Aides to the president say that he was disappointed at Tantawi's failure to act in line with a plan agreed by the president and the minister of defence regarding the security vacuum in Sinai. They also say that Mursi was angered by Tantawi's refusal to remove a second group of generals that the president had concluded had failed to live up to their responsibilities and had even been engaged in attempts to embarrass him personally.

The same aides say that a decision to allow Tantawi to retain his post as minister of defence and head of the SCAF pending the election of a new parliament and the formation of a new government later this year or early next year was taken some weeks ago, prior to the composition of Mursi's first cabinet and a few days before the Rafah attack.

However, Mursi had found it impossible to accept Tantawi's behaviour and had decided to act against him, the sources say, though accounts differ on when the decision to remove Tantawi and Anan was taken. Some sources say it was taken the day Mursi was unable to attend the funeral of the border guards in Cairo, seen as an affront to public opinion, while others say it was taken last Friday when Tantawi told Mursi that he would not dismiss the generals the president wanted to see removed.

On Saturday, Tantawi did not go to his office, and Anan was received by Mursi, being told that an announcement was going to be made "shortly". Both men "knew of the matter and the scheduled announcement", said Yasser Ali, official spokesman for the president, on Monday.

The move to remove Tantawi and Anan, Western diplomats in Cairo agree, was coordinated with Washington, which had originally proposed the retirement of the top SCAF generals in order to end the duality of power in Egypt. Today, the same diplomats are not concerned at the fate of the Armed Forces, considering that this is not threatened despite Tantawi's removal, but rather the fate of Mursi's presidency and the way in which it may now develop.

"What needs to be seen now is whether Mursi will turn into another Mubarak and into a dictator, though an Islamist rather than a military one," said one Cairo-based diplomat. With his decision to force the retirement of Tantawi and Anan, Mursi issued a set of decisions that made him not just the sole holder of executive power, but also the holder of legislative power pending the election of a new parliament. He also holds the reins of the new constitution, since he will be responsible for appointing a new drafting committee in line with Islamist tastes.

The same diplomat said that Mursi's holding of "too many prerogatives" is worrying, especially since they are held by a president who promised, but failed, to assemble elements from across the political spectrum in his government. This has "only two women, and one of them is a Copt, and she is the only non-Muslim in a government headed by an Islamist even if he is not a member of the Brotherhood," the diplomat said.

Mursi had earlier promised to have several vice presidents, including a woman and a Copt, but in fact he has only one more or less Islamist vice president, who is originally a policeman, and not a judge, and who is the brother of the minister of justice.

Fears at Mursi's turning into a dictator are not just current among Western diplomats observing the democratisation process in Egypt, but are also spreading among some non-Islamist politicians, who chose at the 11th hour to support Mursi against Shafik and who now say they fear he has already taken the path of excluding everyone other than "obedient Islamists", in the words of one politician.

The fact that journalists and TV anchors have been told they should scale down their criticisms of Mursi is also worrying, as is the fact that Mursi has decided to suspend his daily radio talk show in which he answered questions from the public. As a result, his decision to remove Tantawi and Anan, though it ends the duality of power in Egypt, could lead to much more than that.


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الخميس، 6 سبتمبر 2012

Mursi and Israel

Regardless of events in Sinai, sooner or later Egypt's new president will be obliged to be unequivocal on his stance on Israel, an issue he has so far avoided, writes Khalil El-Anani

The attack on Egyptian soldiers in Rafah two weeks ago has thrown into relief a subject that has largely been unmentioned and unmentionable since the revolution: Egypt's foreign policy towards Israel. Regardless of who carried out that attack, it constituted a challenge to -- and a qualitative violation of -- Egyptian sovereignty, perhaps the first on such a scale since the 1970s. Sadly, the incident demonstrated that the Egyptian foreign policy compass is fixed on a reactive rather than a proactive stance, complete with strategic forecasting and scenario analysis. In addition, since taking office over a month ago, President Mohamed Mursi has been uninvolved in (or perhaps kept uninvolved in) the foreign policy affairs pertaining to the relationship with Tel Aviv to which, like it or not, Egypt is bound by a peace treaty, however we might disagree over its substance and articles.

Admittedly, Mursi is not in an enviable position with respect to this question. First, he cannot initiate a radical change in Egyptian policy towards Israel, at least during the current phase. The parameters governing this relationship have been and remain a key function of Egyptian intelligence, while the president has served to steer foreign policy guidelines, rather than to execute them. In addition, no one -- not the president, the Muslim Brotherhood, or the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) -- can afford the political costs of instituting a change in Egyptian policy towards Israel. As much as the Egyptian people may hate the Hebrew entity, they would oppose the option of military confrontation, especially if forced upon them in a certain ideological dressing. Egypt is not Iran and the Muslim Brothers are not the mullahs.

Second, Mursi is still caught between two formidable restraints: the Muslim Brotherhood on the one hand and SCAF on the other. Even if he wanted, he could not take an independent policy towards Israel, whether positive or negative. His strong connection with the Muslim Brotherhood clearly exercises a strong influence on his domestic policy and it is likely to have an equally heavy influence on his foreign policy, if not now then soon. At the same time, Mursi cannot jeopardise his relationship with SCAF, at least at present, by pursuing a policy that deviates from the conventions of the military establishment, which favour strategic caution and tactical "patience" in dealing with Tel Aviv.

Third, it is difficult to imagine that Egyptian public opinion will put up for long with President Mursi's non-commitment to an explicit position on Israel. People will begin to regard him as hiding his head in the sand. Sooner or later, he will have to take an unequivocal stance, not just because of the peace treaty but also because the Israeli army is poised at our eastern gateway, which presents a serious potential threat to Egypt's national security. Israel will not regard the peace treaty as an impediment to using the border issue as a pressure card against Mursi on any number of issues, not least of which are Egypt's relationship with Hamas and its position on Iran. We should bear in mind that Israeli forces have breached Egyptian borders on several occasions during the passed three decades on various pretexts and have killed many Egyptian soldiers in the process.

Yet, it is unlikely that Mursi would shift Egypt onto an overtly antagonistic footing with Israel in keeping with the outlook of the ideological group to which he belongs. In spite of the Muslim Brotherhood's anti-Israeli hostility, which, with some members, reaches the degree of refusing to recognise the existence of that state, the Muslim Brothers cannot go against the general mood of the Egyptian public which would oppose a confrontation with Israel on the basis of a Brotherhood agenda. Probably the most that that group can push for is to furnish as much support as possible to Hamas in Gaza. Indeed, this explains why Mursi ordered the Rafah border crossing to be kept open permanently and allowed Palestinians from Gaza to enter Egypt without visas or entry permits. As humanitarian as these decisions were, in my opinion, they should have been given better thought with regard to how to apply them so as avert the negative consequences that would mar Egyptian-Palestinian relations, as occurred following the criminal attack against the Egyptian army that is said to have been carried out by Palestinian and Egyptian jihadist elements.

In short, Mursi should bring himself to acknowledge the bitter truth. Dealing with Israel is not an option. It is an imperative dictated by Egyptian interests. The longer he puts off recognising this fact and the longer he keeps his government's position in the grey zone, the more complications this will cause for Egypt's foreign policy. Mursi does not have to accept Israeli conditions for the realisation of a peace treaty with the Palestinians. However, he should develop a clear vision for how to manage the relationship with Tel Aviv, at least from the strategic and security perspective, if not from the political one, and he should inform the public of this vision.

Towards the formulation of such a vision, he would be well advised to engage two instruments. The first is to form a non-partisan presidential advisory committee consisting of experts on the Israeli question, which is a complex national security issue with numerous and diverse domestic and foreign ramifications. The committee should include former diplomats, military and intelligence experts, and scholars with demonstrable expertise on the matter. Egypt has no shortage of such experts so the creation of such a committee merely awaits a presidential initiative. The second instrument would be an Egyptian-Palestinian council or joint committee that would focus on all the outstanding issues between the two sides (border controls, security coordination, regulating economic, commercial and cultural relations, etc). Such a body would serve not only to quell commotion over the special relationship between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, it would also avert situations that would cause the Palestinians to lose Egyptian support. I do not believe there would be a serious obstacle to acting on this proposal either, as long as the political will exists.

The writer is researcher at School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University.


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