Intruder arrested at home of Miley Cyrus

SAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) - A man suspected of kidnapping his two young children and fleeing with them aboard a stolen yacht along the Northern California coast has been arrested, and the youngsters safely returned to their mother, police and the U.S. Coast Guard said on Saturday. Christopher Maffei, 43, who was taken into custody on Friday evening off Monterey, California, is accused of abducting his son and daughter on Tuesday from their mother's home in South San Francisco, according to police. ...

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Odd bedfellows

The United States and the Muslim Brotherhood are not as far apart as they can sometimes seem, writes Bassem Hassan

The Egyptian presidential race kept many people on their toes in anticipation of the changes it would bring, among others things to Egyptian-American relations. But two months after President Mohamed Mursi was sworn in, it is more or less business as usual. American officials are still welcome in Cairo, where they exchange compliments with their Egyptian counterparts and now also with the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders. For his part, Mursi is packing for his first trip to Washington. Both anxieties about, and hopes for, a major change in Egyptian-American relations have been misplaced, based on the rhetoric of the Brotherhood and of American officials.

Less attention has been paid to the long history of cooperation between the United States and Sunni Muslim conservative regimes and groups. Statements meant for the appeasement of domestic constituencies aside, the American-Sunni conservative alliance has been one of the most enduring features of politics in the Arab and Muslim worlds. In fact, America's entry to the Arab world in 1945 was through Saudi Arabia, the chief patron of Sunni-conservatism in the Arab world. In the post-World War II world, both America and Sunni conservatives found common enemies in nationalist leaders such as former presidents Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Egypt and Sukarno in Indonesia.

Then came the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The United States, the Saudis, the Pakistanis and Sunni Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, generously chipped in to this inter-faith project against the infidel communists that had taken over Afghanistan. Many believed that the events of 9/11 were some type of closure to this not-so-secret love affair. However, they were wrong, as America quickly re-established it: as US journalist Seymour Hersh revealed in The New Yorker magazine a few years ago, the two reunited to confront the Syria-Hizbullah-Iran alliance, and after Israel's failure to destroy Hizbullah in Lebanon, Washington decided to put its money on Sunni-conservatism instead.

The cooperation between America and its allies in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and various jihadist groups to topple the Syrian regime, now denoted as Alawi rather than pan-Arab or socialist as part of the manufacturing of a new terminology that fits the current confrontation better, is just the latest manifestation of this renewed partnership. Even Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has felt it was time to reconnect with his roots and to abandon his previous partnership plans with Syria and Iran.

During the brief breakup following the events of 9/11, cooperation between America and Sunni-conservatism did not come to a complete halt, as evinced by the collaboration between Iraqi politician Tareq Al-Hashimi's Islamic Party and the American occupation authorities in Iraq. Hence, when it comes to exploring the prospects of Egyptian-American relations a good place to start is by examining the interests of the Brotherhood and the United States, rather than looking at their public statements. After all, politicians, including pious brethren, tend to lie whenever it is expedient for them to do so.

For some time to come the Brotherhood in Egypt will have only one goal: to stay in power. Other political groups, with the possible exception of the Salafis, lack the means to challenge them in any upcoming elections. Using the state machinery, now under their control, the Brotherhood will try to ensure that this situation does not change anytime soon. This leaves them with two hurdles to climb over: Egypt's collapsed economy and the military.

The latter still has the capacity to significantly influence the outcome of the political process in this country, the brethren's jubilation following the recent changes in its leadership notwithstanding. America's support is also crucial to overcoming these challenges. Fortunately for the Brotherhood, America is more than willing to help since its main interests in Egypt -- the Suez Canal, the treaty with Israel, the establishment of a pluralist political system, the deeper integration of Egypt in the globalised capitalist system and the maintenance of close relations with the army -- are not threatened by the Brotherhood's ascendancy. Quite the contrary: the brethren could serve these interests.

The Brotherhood could bestow on US-favoured neo-liberal policies and the American-Egyptian alliance two types of legitimacy, one electoral and one religious. The Sadat-Mubarak regime failed to accomplish this, and the liberal parties supported by the business community are not up to the job. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, seems more than willing to play ball. It long ago abandoned the anti-capitalist spirit espoused by some of its ideologues in the mid-20th century. Its current leadership includes ardent free-market supporters like Khairat El-Shater and Hassan Malik. The latter, as the US magazine Businessweek aptly put it, can "easily blend in with the Wall Street crowd".

The current debate about a future IMF loan to Egypt is also quite revealing in this respect. A few years ago Mursi, then an MP, slammed such loans as un-Islamic. Ironically, today he is touting an IMF loan as his first economic achievement. American visitors who frequented the Brotherhood's headquarters after the fall of former president Hosni Mubarak must have realised that they see eye-to-eye with the brethren when it comes to the economy. In contrast, Ahmed Shafik, Mursi's competitor in the elections, expressed a commitment to the role of the state in the economy. In so doing, he was in line with the traditional view of the military, which averted the privatisation of the main state-owned banks in Egypt in the past. The military itself also runs what could be considered to be an "informal public sector" that has so far evaded the IMF. These assets are a coveted prize for the Brotherhood, which did not share in the spoils of the privatisations carried out under Mubarak.

The Brotherhood and the United States also share an interest in curtailing the political influence of the army. The former's reasons are quite obvious; the latter's require some elaboration. The United States has what is best described as a love-hate relationship with the Egyptian military. On the one hand, it is its main weapons supplier and training provider, a position that it is planning to maintain. On the other hand, it is not in favour of the army's economic role in Egypt and is concerned about its political intentions.

It suffices, in this respect, to highlight the fact that the military made a series of decisions that alarmed Washington more than the Brotherhood's rhetoric, for instance by allowing Iranian warships to pass through the Suez Canal, closing down major American NGOs in Cairo, terminating gas sales to Israel and ending the Gaza blockade. Establishing a pluralist political system consisting of pro-capitalism parties, a Western-funded civil society and a corporate media would be the most efficient means to contain the army's influence in Egypt. Needless to say, the Brotherhood would also benefit from any such arrangement.

Only one thorny issue remains: relations with Israel. Yet, even here the difference is about appearance rather than substance. Mursi has repeatedly declared his intention to respect Egypt's international agreements, including the treaty with Israel. During the presidential campaign, some of his supporters went as far as to consider abiding by the treaty to be a religious obligation as long as Israel also respected it. Moreover, Mursi has been keen to avoid any discussion of the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs), the most outstanding manifestation of economic normalisation with Israel. The Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv has not been recalled, and the Israeli flag is still flying in Cairo's skies. Most importantly, the Egyptian army, which according to the brethren is now under Mursi's full control, is coordinating its current campaign in Sinai with Israel.

The fact that Mursi wants to keep these positions off the radar to appease his domestic and regional constituencies is quite understandable; hence, his aides' frantic denial that he exchanged letters with his Israeli counterpart. But the Obama administration, for its own equally understandable reasons, also needs him to come out of the closet. Unfortunately for Mursi, his first visit to Washington will come shortly before the American presidential elections, meaning that the American-Egyptian-Israeli triangle will be a news item in the American media, at least for a few days.

Obama will probably encourage Mursi to be more open about his orientation, maybe by visiting a staunch pro-Israel institute as the Tunisian Al-Nahda Party leader Rachid Al-Ghannouchi did on his first visit to Washington after the Islamists' victory in Tunisia. Obama would appreciate such a gesture if for no other reason than to thwart Republican Party attacks that accuse him of letting down an erstwhile ally and of himself being a Muslim. This sounds like a fair price for the Obama administration's recognition of Mursi, despite the irregularities that marred the Egyptian elections, such as the repeated threats of violence if Mursi lost, his supporters' sectarian propaganda, and the prevention of Christians in some areas from voting. Furthermore, the administration did not protest against Mursi's assuming both the executive and legislative powers in Egypt, which flies in the face of the principle of checks and balances. So, will Mursi acquiesce, or will he hide behind a beard?

The United States courted the Brotherhood even before Mubarak's fall. But it takes two to tango. So far the Brotherhood has been happy to let America lead, while trying to create the impression, especially at home, that it is seeking new dance partners during four and 36-hour visits to Tehran and Beijing, respectively. Will it manage to keep up this image for long? It seems doubtful. Mursi's aides should make sure they pack his favourite dancing shoes, as all eyes will be turned on him when he makes his first appearance in Washington later this month.

The writer is a political analyst.

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Press review

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Stepping up the money hunt

Hopes are high that a newly-formed national commission will be able to recover money smuggled abroad by members of the former Mubarak regime, writes Gamal Essam El-Din

Egypt's Islamist President Mohamed Mursi is about to issue a presidential decree to set up a national commission entrusted with recovering money smuggled outside Egypt by the family and cronies of ousted former president Hosni Mubarak.

The six-article decree states that the new commission will open an inquiry into all reports and lawsuits regarding money smuggled out of Egypt since 1992. A technical secretariat will be formed to take the measures necessary to trace the wealth of Mubarak, his family and henchmen.

"The secretariat will conduct negotiations with all international and regional organisations and foreign countries to gather as much information about Mubarak's wealth as possible," Article 2 of the decree says.

Article 5 states that the Ministry of Finance will open a special bank account at the Central Bank of Egypt for money recovered from abroad. Article 6 will make it obligatory for all state institutions to surrender the documents necessary for the commission to move forward.

Some sources put Mubarak's wealth at more than $70 billion, most of it in the UK and Switzerland. The fact that Mubarak's wife Suzanne is Anglo-Egyptian caused the family to invest most of its wealth in England, sources say. Legal experts in Egypt have lamented the fact that the British authorities are not helping in recovering money possessed by the Mubarak family in the UK.

The UK government announced this week that it was planning to send an expert to Egypt to help recover Mubarak's money. While UK Foreign Secretary William Hague once said that the UK was ready to offer all the help necessary to Egypt to recover the stolen money, his statement has never given rise to any concrete steps.

Hossam Eissa, a legal expert and member of the new commission, said "there should be adequate documented information about the money stolen and smuggled out of Egypt, so that European countries will assist in recovering this money."

Eissa criticised the UK for not doing enough to help Egypt in tracing the Mubarak family's illegal wealth in the UK. A report by the BBC this week indicated that the wealth of Mubarak's family in the UK was estimated at some 85 billion pounds sterling (about $135 billion) and that regime cronies also possess more than 15 billion pounds sterling in assets and personal accounts in the UK.

The report said a house owned by Gamal Mubarak in London's Knightsbridge district is estimated to be worth 10 million pounds sterling.

The wealth of the cronies of the former Mubarak regime has been the focus of public attention lately, when an investigative judge decided to place former presidential candidate and Mubarak's last prime minister Ahmed Shafik on a watch list on 29 August.

Shafik will be questioned over alleged corruption, notably by helping Mubarak's two sons Alaa and Gamal to obtain 40,000 metres of land near Ismailia at the low price of 70 piastres per metre. A complaint filed by Essam Sultan, a former parliamentary deputy and lawyer, alleged that Shafik had used his position as chair of the Association of Air Pilots in 1993 to sell Gamal and Alaa the land.

On Monday, the investigative judge, Osama El-Saidi, ordered that Nabil Shukri, former chair of the association, be placed in custody after he admitted being forced by Shafik to help Gamal and Alaa obtain the land.

Shafik's lawyer strongly denied that his client had been involved in corruption. Shafik, currently in Abu Dhabi, said "the charges levelled against me are politically motivated."

"An avalanche of accusations was directed at me after the end of the presidential elections, but this was no surprise due to the power of one party going after me," he said, referring to the Muslim Brotherhood, to which Shafik's opponent Mohamed Mursi, now Egypt's president, belongs.

Shafik's lawyer, Shawqi El-Sayed, said the complaints filed against Shafik were malicious and aimed at tarnishing his image. El-Sayed said Shafik had never been summoned for questioning and that his defence team should be informed of any charges against him.

Yehia Qadri, another of Shafik's lawyers, said that "Mubarak's two sons Gamal and Alaa bought the land from the board of the Association of the Air Pilots in 1990 and before Shafik was appointed its chairman in 1992." He said that "Shafik had just signed the purchase contract when Alaa and Gamal wanted to document it with the public notary."

Joining forces with Shafik, prominent sociologist Saadeddin Ibrahim said that "Islamist facism is out to get Shafik and all those who attacked the Muslim Brotherhood."

Closely related to the charges against Shafik are two complaints filed against Sami Anan, former military chief of staff and deputy chairman of the former ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Mohamed El-Tohami, former chair of the Administrative Control Authority (ACA).

Lawyer Samir Sabri has charged that Anan made a huge amount of money from houses and plots of land in the upscale Golf district east of Cairo. "Anan violated the law by obtaining two plots of land in the same district, the first estimated at 600 metres and the second at around 1,000 metres," Sabri said.

President Mursi awarded Anan the Medal of the Republic when he was sent into retirement on 12 August, leading some to think that Anan would be immune to subsequent investigation.

El-Tohami is accused of using his position between 2008 and 2012 to help businessmen and cronies of the former regime to avoid investigation or trial.

In his complaint, Moetasem Fathi, a former ACA officer, said "El-Tohami declined to give the prosecution authorities documents about the corruption of former Mubarak regime officials and helped fake documents so they could avoid persecution."

Eissa said "it is natural that the wealth of Mubarak and his cronies will remain a major public issue for some time. We have a lot of statements and documents about the wealth of the former regime to look into, but it will take a while to make sure these are soundly based."

"Some of the complaints filed against former regime officials could be motivated by revenge and a desire to settle accounts. For this reason, we have high hopes that the new commission will put the inquiries on the right track," he said.

On 29 August after a year-and-a-half of inquiries, the state-affiliated Illicit Gains Authority (IGA) decided to refer Safwat El-Sherif, Mubarak's long-time minister of information and secretary-general of the former ruling National Democratic Party, for trial on charges of profiteering and securing wealth estimated at LE300 million ($50 million) by illegal means.

The IGA said El-Sherif, also former chairman of the Shura Council, the upper house of the Egyptian parliament, and his two sons Ashraf and Ihab had illegally taken possession of 56 villas, chalets and plots of land.

It said that El-Sherif had built a mosque on a plot of land he owned illegally. The report added that El-Sherif's two sons had used their father's job as minister of information to build a media empire that was able to manipulate television satellite channels.

El-Sherif is currently facing trial on charges of masterminding attacks on peaceful protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square during the revolution. He is one of several former Mubarak regime officials to be under investigation, among them Fathi Sorour, former speaker of the People's Assembly, who faces charges of manslaughter and profiteering.

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Mayor of NJ's capital arrested in corruption probe

TRENTON, N.J. (AP) — Federal agents arrested the mayor of New Jersey's capital early Monday as part of a corruption investigation, alleging he agreed to accept bribes in connection with a proposed parking garage — actually a fake project created by authorities trying to capture him.

Trenton Mayor Tony Mack, his brother Ralphiel and convicted sex offender Joseph Giorgianni, a Mack supporter who owns a Trenton sandwich shop, were accused of conspiring to obstruct, delay and affect interstate commerce by extortion under color of official right.

Federal prosecutors alleged Mack agreed to use his influence in connection with a proposed parking garage in the city. The garage was made up — a fake project created by investigators to try to capture Mack, who has financial problems and attracted legal scrutiny since he took office.

U.S. Attorney Paul Fishman said at a news conference Monday that the city-owned land for the garage was assessed at $271,000. He said Mack and Giorgianni agreed to accept $100,000 for the land for the city coffers — as long as the purported developers paid a bribe of $100,000 to be split between the two alleged conspirators.

A federal magistrate Monday ordered Mack released on $150,000 bond but ruled that he cannot leave the state while free on bail. Mack's attorney would not comment on the case.

Federal agents began working with an informant to gather information on Mack and the others in September 2010, just two months after Mack took office. Fishman would not say when the investigation began or why.

Fishman said investigators quickly understood the relationship between the mayor and the sandwich shop owner: "It became clear he was a bagman for the mayor."

The defendants received $54,000 and anticipated accepting an additional $65,000 from a cooperating witness who purported to be a developer, according to court documents that laid out the sting.

The criminal complaint portrays Giorgianni as a boastful man who did most of the talking with two FBI informants — one who was cooperating to get a better deal in his own criminal case, another who was paid.

The sting was similar to the massive "Bid Rig" sting that resulted in criminal charges against 46 people — many of them local officials — in 2009. Then, bribes were attached to fictitious development projects. Prosecutors have had mixed success in winning convictions.

Giorgianni complained at one point that Mack, 46, could not take bribes because he was being watched so closely, the documents said. "It's sickening," he told one of the informants, according to the court papers.

"I like to make money for my friends," he said, according to the papers, and went on to reference infamously corrupt political boss William M. Tweed. "I like to do it like the Boss Tweed way. You know Boss Tweed ran Tammany Hall?"

He was also caught on tape telling one of the informants: "One thing about the Mack administration — when I say that, it's me and Mack — we're not greedy. We're corruptible. We want anybody to make a buck," and "I'm there to buffer the thing where, you know, take the weight ... going to jail's my business. It ain't his."

By contrast, when Mack was recorded, it was mostly just to say he'd meet someone or exchanging pleasantries. But in April, he was recorded at a meeting with Giorgianni and one of the informants saying: "I really appreciate what you guys have done for us. I appreciate your support and, like before, I support you and I'll keep on supporting you."

Authorities say, though, that the short-in-stature Mack, whom Giorgianni referred to as "Napoleon," was involved in the scheme. One piece of evidence they offer is that Giorgianni referred to money by code — calling it "Uncle Remus" — when he spoke with Mack, and that Mack seemed to know what he was saying.

The complaint also said that $2,500 in $100 bills with the serial numbers of those given to Giorgianni were found in a search of Ralphiel Mack's home in July.

Tony Mack was taken to an FBI office in Hamilton for processing and was driven into a secure area of the federal courthouse in Trenton at around 11 a.m. He was due in court later in the afternoon.

His administration has been in turmoil from Day 1, staggering from one crisis to another. A housecleaning of staff at City Hall opened the door for Mack's own appointees, who quickly turned it into a revolving door.

Under an agreement reached last year, the Democrat may hire department heads only from a pool of applicants the state offers or he risks losing $6 million in state aid.

Under state law, he would be forced out of office if he is convicted. But activists in Trenton would like to see him step down immediately. "If he were smart, he'd resign," said Jerell Blakely, a former campaign manager for Mack who is now a critic. Blakely predicted Mack would not step down on his own.

The mayor and his brother could each face 20 years in prison if convicted.

Giorgianni and eight others were charged separately Monday with a scheme to distribute oxycodone from the sandwich shop, and he was also charged with weapon possession by a convicted felon. He went to prison in the 1980s on charges of carnally abusing and debauching the morals of a 14-year-old girl in the back of his shop.

The case gained notoriety because of weight-related health problems that got Giorgianni, a steakhouse owner who once claimed to tip the scale at over 500 pounds, released and led a prosecutor to charge he "ate his way out of jail."

He faces up to 50 years in prison if he's convicted on all charges.

___

Follow Mulvihill at http://www.twitter.com/geoffmulvihill.

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Mursi beyond Tehran

In the Iranian capital and in Cairo, Dina Ezzat deciphers President Mursi's Iran visit, its intentions and possible outcomes Mursi (r)attended the NAM summit with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and Iranian chief of Expediency Council, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Tehran

"It is still early to talk about specifics regarding Egyptian-Iranian relations," said Yasser Ali, the Egyptian presidential spokesman.

Ali was speaking to Al-Ahram Weekly as President Mohamed Mursi was exiting the meeting room at the Tehran Conference Hall where he had conferred with his Iranian counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for around 40 minutes, following the participation of both in the opening session of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran Thursday, whereby Mursi transferred the rotated presidency of the summit from Egypt to Iran.

According to Ali's statement to the Weekly and that of Ambassador Alaa Youssef, the head of Egypt's Interest Section in Iran, and of Ambassador Moatez Ahmadine, Egypt's permanent representative to the UN headquarters in New York, the venue of the NAM Secretariat, Mursi's brief visit to Tehran on his way back from Beijing was by and large multilateral with not much bilateral input.

"Of course, there were good exchanges of courteous statements and an emphasis by President Ahmadinejad on the respect that Iran has for Egypt and its great people, and its great [25 January] revolution. Of course Egyptian President Mursi, in turn, expressed respect for Iran and its history and its role, but we cannot say that bilateral relations were really discussed," commented an Iranian official who took part in the Mursi-Ahmadinejad encounter.

He added that eventually the time would come for that, because ultimately "what the two nations, these two great nations, have in common is much bigger than their differences."

The visit of Mursi to Tehran, which started late morning and ended early afternoon, is the first such high-level visit by an Egyptian official to Tehran after it severed its relations with Egypt in 1979 at a time of the establishment of the Islamic Republic, when refuge was offered by then Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat to Iran's ousted Shah, and against the backdrop of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Since that time, relations between Cairo and Tehran went from cold to hostile. Differences between the two countries grew with the time from mere political differences over the management of the Arab-Israeli struggle to differences over the Islamist rule of Iran versus relatively secular rule in Egypt, and of Sunni versus Shia leadership in the Middle East, especially during the years of war between Iran and Iraq, then under the leadership of president Saddam Hussein, in the late 1980s.

The visit of Mursi to Tehran this week, as head of the Egyptian delegation to the NAM summit, was hoped by many to signal the end of these differences and to initiate a new rapprochement that could eventually lead to the normalisation of relations -- something that was attempted by former foreign minister Amr Moussa under the rule of Hosni Mubarak in the late 1990s, but that he did not successfully pull off, according to Egyptian diplomats, due to Mubarak's hesitation and US influence over his foreign policy choices.

None of the aspired to change happened, according to almost identical accounts offered by Egyptian and Iranian officials, during Mursi's brief visit to Tehran. Rather the contrary could well be true, some officials say.

Mursi received huge media attention upon his arrival to Imam Khomeini International Airport and upon his departure from the Tehran Conference Hall. It is also true that Mursi referred to his Iranian counterpart as "my dear brother" during the opening of the summit. Following the visit of Mursi, the Iranian president also told the Iranian official press that, "Egyptians and Iranians have so much in common."

However, beyond this symbolism there is very little to be said in terms of substance on a positive outcome of Mursi's visit to Tehran from a bilateral perspective.

Mursi was not at all sensitive, in the assessment of Iranian individuals who spoke to the Weekly in Tehran, over Shia reluctance to the mention of some of the Prophet Mohamed's associates in his ultra-Islamic greeting at the beginning of what was otherwise a political speech in the opening of the NAM summit.

"May God's peace and prayers be upon the Prophet Mohamed and his sahabah (close associates) Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali and that of the Holy Family of the Prophet," Mursi said at the onset of his speech.

While the mention of the last, Ali and the Holy Family of the Prophet, falls squarely within the bounds of predominantly Shia Iran appreciation, the reference to the first three is all but a taboo according to the Shia sect.

According to one of Mursi's aides, the reference in its totality was designed to indicate the need to go beyond the barriers of division in Muslim history between those that Shias appreciate and those appreciated by Sunnis, the predominant Muslim sect in Egypt.

This might have been the intention, but Mursi's interlocutors were certainly offended. According to one Iranian official who asked not to be named, this introductory paragraph in the speech of Mursi acted as a reminder of statements that the Egyptian president had earlier made in Saudi Arabia where he spoke in an untypical fashion for an Egyptian head of state on Egyptian-Saudi determination to defend the Sunni sect.

According to an Egyptian diplomat who accompanied Mursi during the visit to Saudi Arabia in early July, that Sunni emphasis "came out of nowhere" and it was not introduced or advised by diplomatic aides to the president, nor had it ever been part of Egyptian political jargon.

"I remember back in 2004 when [ousted president] Mubarak made a reference in a TV interview to the attempt of Iranian Shias to get in alliance with the Shia majority in Iraq, the [Egyptian] Foreign Ministry strongly advised against this line. Egypt does not identify itself as a Sunni state but as a leading Arab Muslim state," the diplomat said.

The ultra-Muslim stance and specific Sunni identification that Mursi seemed to be proposing in his speech before NAM was not just offending to the Iranians. It was also perceived as unfortunate back home in Egypt.

"This is a really disturbing remark," suggested Amin Iskandar, a Nasserist politician and member of the Arab Affairs Committee in the dissolved People's Assembly.

"The introduction of Mursi's speech is not becoming of that of the president of Egypt. Why talk about Sunni versus Shia matters in the onset of a political speech before an international organisation? What was the purpose? Was Mursi trying to reposition Egypt as an Islamist state now?" asked Iskandar.

He added: "Egypt had never been trapped in the Sunni-Shia polarisation game and it should not be doing so today, and not ever, because that goes against its regional leadership interests and consequently against its national security interests."

For his part, prominent political scientist and commentator Amr El-Shobaki, who generally held a positive view of Mursi's trip to Iran, argued that the Sunni versus Shia component in the speech before NAM was uncalled for and unfortunate.

"Egypt is not a radical Sunni state; Egypt is a state of a very moderate Sunni majority that has an affinity to the Holy Family and has as such a very unique nature to its Sunni Islam. Egypt through Al-Azhar University has always played a leading role in bridging the gap between Sunnis and Shias and it should not be abandoning this crucial mission, which is not only religious but indeed cultural and strategic," El-Shobaki added.

If some were offended by the Sunni aspect in Mursi's speech, others were perturbed by what they qualified as the "Muslim Brotherhood policy line" they said Mursi put across in the speech.

"When the Egyptian president spoke against Damascus he was, I am afraid, reflecting his perspective as a leading Muslim Brotherhood figure and not as that of the president of what is supposed to be a leading Arab state," commented Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallim, who headed the delegation of his country to the NAM summit.

In his speech, Mursi crossed borders he had personally embraced with regards to the Egyptian position on the Syrian file. Mursi used to speak of the need for the legitimate demands of the Syrian people for democratisation to be observed and for bloodshed to come to an end. In Tehran, the Egyptian president surprised his hosts, the closest regional allies to the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, with an unprecedented attack on the Syrian regime for its actions during 18-month plus protests-turned-armed confrontations.

Mursi qualified the Al-Assad regime as an "oppressive regime" and insisted that it had "lost legitimacy". Indeed, the president equated the Syrian people under Al-Assad with the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.

"This was the talk of a member of the Muslim Brotherhood," restated Al-Muallim.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria are particularly active within the ranks of an otherwise diversified Syrian opposition that emerged in March 2011 demonstrations to end the rule of the Alawite minority, a Shia offshoot, that has headed Syria from the 1970s until today.

Iskandar too was critical of what he qualified as Muslim Brotherhood influence over the position that Mursi expressed with regards to Syria. "We are all appreciative of the legitimate and overdue demand of the Syrians for democracy. There are no two ways about it. However, it is impossible for anyone to equate the regime of Al-Assad, despite the horrid bloodshed in Syria, with the Israeli occupation of Palestine," Iskandar said.

According to Iskandar, "had Mursi been really concerned about the call for freedom and democracy he should have also made a reference to the call for democracy in Bahrain," where the Shia majority has for over a year been protesting against persecution at the hands of Sunni minority rule.

"For Mursi, it is not a matter of defending freedom but rather a matter of defending the Muslim Brotherhood perspective and associations," Iskandar suggested. He added that this line is compatible with the foreign policy agenda of Qatar, "that has an increasing influence over Egyptian foreign policy," adding that "Qatar is a regional proxy for the US."

During his visit to Tehran, President Mursi had a brief encounter with the emir of Qatar who had just visited Egypt mid-August. "The Qataris are opposed to the regime of Al-Assad, but not to the persecution of Shia in Bahrain, and Mursi spoke about Syria under the pretext of defending freedoms but completely dropped Bahrain," Iskandar criticised.

Indeed, the Iranian interpreter who was translating Mursi's speech into Persian was said, according to Iranian journalists, to have played around with his translation. In converting Mursi's speech into Persian, the Iranian interpreter pinned the attack made by the Egyptian president on the Bahraini rather than the Syrian regime.

Nonetheless, many Egyptian politicians and commentators had a positive reaction to Mursi's statements on Syria. "It was an overdue support," El-Shobaki said.

According to El-Shobaki, it is reductionist to suggest that the Egyptian position expressed by Mursi in Tehran is an outcome of Qatari influence over Egyptian foreign policy. "This is absolutely exaggerated," he said. El-Shobaki made reference to the criticism that the majority of Egyptian political quarters expressed against what they qualified as Mursi's "hesitant and flat positions on Syria".

"In Tehran, the president should have acknowledged the Bahraini call for democracy, but his failure to do so does not mean that he should have also overlooked a very bloody situation in Syria, especially that the support for the Syrian revolution is widely sensed not just in Egyptian political circles but indeed in the Egyptian street," El-Shobaki suggested.

According to Amr Ramadan, deputy assistant foreign minister, Mursi had already called for a political end to the crisis in Syria. During his participation in the extraordinary summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) held two weeks ago in Mecca, at the invitation of the Saudi monarch, Mursi called for the launch of a working group of the OIC to help find resolution to the situation in Syria.

In Tehran, on Thursday, and Friday when the summit closed, Ramadan added, Egypt was supportive of a resolution that the NAM meeting adopted to welcome the mission of the new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi.

"What we opposed was an Iranian proposal to start a NAM working group on Syria, and our rationale there was simple: there are already several mechanisms and what is needed now is the coordination of efforts rather than the launch of a parallel mediation process," Ramadan suggested.

At the end of the day, both Ramadan and El-Shobaki agree that what Mursi did in essence with his remarks in Syria during the NAM summit was to substantiate Egypt's commitment to take a clear stance on the matter.

Indeed, in the analysis of El-Shobaki, the clear outcome of the Mursi visit to Tehran is the re-launching of Egyptian foreign policy.

Mursi in his speech also departed from the traditional reconciliatory line that Egypt had for the past 10 years embraced on the Palestinian cause. The president voiced direct and untypical criticism of Israel and highlighted previously overlooked matters, like the fate of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.

"This file is a crucial matter on the agenda of NAM. It had received much attention during the Egyptian presidency of the NAM summit and it is recommended as a priority issue in the transfer report that Egypt made during the handover of the presidency of the summit," Ramadan argued.

Moreover, the NAM summit made a commitment to support the diplomatic and political attempts to get Palestine permanent and full membership in the UN, in view of the failure of the so-called "peace process" to lead to a Palestinian state.

"Of course this mobilisation, in which Egypt is playing a key role, is not at all to the liking of the Israelis and they are endlessly complaining about it," the same diplomat suggested.

Egyptian diplomats who spoke on condition of anonymity said that the mere participation of Mursi in a Tehran-hosted summit is in itself a clear message to Israel that Egypt is no longer hostage to what makes Israel comfortable or not.

"We were told clearly that the Israelis are feeling very apprehensive about this visit, even when they knew that it was not designed to re-launch diplomatic relations immediately," said one diplomat.

Alarm against Mursi's visit to Tehran was sounded also in Washington. "There was much pressure, but it was declined," the same diplomat added.

According to Ramadan, the decision of Egypt to participate at this high level was made in view of the reclaimed attention that Egypt is giving to its role in the Third World.

"In a sense, the decision was made irrespective of the venue of the summit. NAM might not be making as much commotion as it used to during the heydays when it was first launched with the support, and indeed initiative, of [late president Gamal] Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s, but ultimately it is a grouping that brings together about two thirds of UN member states," Ramadan said.

He added that the issues on the agenda of NAM, which range from international conflicts to disarmament and economic and environmental cooperation, fall squarely within the list of priorities of Egyptian foreign policy.

And the fact that Mursi went to Tehran, El-Shobaki argued, opens a new phase of Egyptian foreign policy by which Egypt would not restrict itself to communication with the countries it sees eye-to-eye with.

"The president went to Tehran in a positive sign of goodwill. But while there he did not shy away from expressing disagreements between Cairo and Tehran. This is the way things should be," El-Shobaki said.

The shaking and remaking of Egyptian foreign policy seems to be a priority for Mursi. The president, who repeatedly committed to observe the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and who is as yet acting in line with the close alliance between Cairo and Washington, is venturing into a wider spectrum and a more diversified sphere of communication.

Ahead of his short and controversial visit to Tehran, Mursi had been in Beijing. For October, he is planning visits to Malaysia and Indonesia, whose vice president he met while in Tehran. He is also considering a trip to Brazil and Chile, which will possibly come in the wake of his visit to New York during the last week of this month to head the Egyptian delegation to the UN General Assembly.

The South America and Asian trips are in parallel with plans to visit European capitals that Egypt keeps in close relation with.

"If Egypt is aiming to reassume its leadership it needs to take clear positions on key matters and to widen its scope of foreign policy engagement. I think Mursi is attempting to do both," El-Shobaki concluded.

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Dangerous to freedom

A ministerial decree to amend the current emergency law has been rejected outright, Mona El-Nahhas reports

Nakhnoukh is a name that may be on everyone's lips these days, but it was a familiar name to many even before his arrest. He was known as "The Muallim" (master) to those in his employ and as "The General" in hooligan circles, he introduced himself to the prosecutor-general's office as the owner of a private security firm and chairman of the board of directors of the Sawt Al-Dawla (Voice of the Nation) newspaper. In fact, the newspaper was more in the nature of his own mouthpiece, for he was the hidden voice of the former regime who, according to leaks from persons close to him, was the man who took charge of those difficult tasks that the regime needed done when it came to parliamentary elections and shady land deals. He was the stick that was brought down on those who refused to cooperate.

He had built up a small empire and wielded his sceptre from a villa in King Mariout gated community on the outskirts of Alexandria. He displayed his power and status in the types of animals he purchased, his evening revelries, and his personal discotheque in his villa compound. The shadier side of his life has begun to emerge during the investigations in the prosecutor-general's office in Alexandria. A general picture is taking shape and we can expect further details from the hearings of his trial, now that prosecutor-general Ibrahim El-Halbawi has arraigned him on charges of thuggery, possession of drugs and unlicensed arms, possession of devices enabling him to make international phone calls, possession of beasts of prey without a licence and facilitating prostitution. At the same time, the Alexandria Court of Appeals prosecutors office and the office of the deputy prosecutor-general in Cairo are coordinating in investigations into Nakhnoukh's relationship with the former regime and, specifically, his involvement in the violence that erupted shortly after the January Revolution began. On this aspect of "The General's" darker side, Mohamed El-Beltagui of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership described Nakhnoukh, in a television talk show, as the commander of the National Democratic Party's secret organisation which engineered parliamentary elections and organised violence.

In his deposition before the prosecution-general, Nakhnoukh was cool and systematic in his denial of the allegations. He said that he had licences for the weapons that were confiscated from his home, as well as for the lions and dogs he possessed. He stated that he had purchased the lions 13 years ago, and that he has no knowledge of the automated weapons that were mentioned in the charges. He also made it clear that he had not been present at the villa for 10 consecutive months because he had been in Lebanon on what he described as a combination of business trip and holiday from 20 December to 18 August. His lawyers explained that MB leader El-Beltagui instigated Nakhnoukh's arrest through inflammatory remarks in a television talk show. They submitted a recording of that programme on Nakhnoukh's mobile phone as proof that Muslim Brotherhood "incitement" was the sole reason for his arrest, adding that Nakhnoukh travels regularly outside the country and that when he last returned to Egypt through Cairo International Airport there were no pending cases that would have caused him to be detained at the airport.

The lawyers argued that the case being brought against Nakhnoukh was no more than a vendetta being waged by the Muslim Brotherhood in revenge for his having been a supporter of the former regime. They maintain that no specific names were mentioned in connection with the allegations in this regard and that the same applied with regard to the charge of "facilitating prostitution" in artistic circles.

Although hashish was found and served as the basis of the allegation of drug dealing, Nakhnoukh claims that they were solely for his personal consumption. "There is no evidence whatsoever that I ever was involved in drug trafficking," he said. With regard to the other vice charge, he said, "I know only one of the women that were mentioned and she is the wife of my assistant. I do not know any of the other girls. They came to the villa because they know that I have good relations with performers and producers and they hoped I would introduce them to someone who would help them in their acting careers." Although there had been women in his villa on the evening before his arrest, he claims that he had been asleep at the time and that he had never seen them before the morning of the day he was arrested. The 46-year-old Sabri Nakhnoukh is unmarried, but says that he had just become engaged during his last visit to Lebanon. Among the papers the prosecutor-general's office found in his home were a weapon's licence issued in his name from Lebanon and a letter stating that he worked as a media advisor to the embassy of Uzbekistan in Egypt.

During the first hearing in Alexandria, the alleged thug baron claimed that the reason for his arrest was his disputes with the current heads of the Ministry of Interior. When asked about the nature of these disputes, he said that he had cooperated with the former regime which availed itself of his services during parliamentary elections.

During the second hearing, Nakhnoukh was accused of having met with the former minister of interior in 2005, just before the parliamentary elections were held that year. In that meeting, Nakhnoukh was allegedly asked to organise thugs to man the polling stations in order to keep out NDP voters. He was also accused of being involved in vote purchasing and in pro-regime violence following the revolution. Nakhnoukh denied his relationship with the former regime and any of its chief figures, contrary to the purported "leaks" to the press.

CONFISCATED ITEMS: Among the prosecution-general hearings with Nakhnoukh, two sessions were held in the prosecutor-general's department in the Alexandrian area of Al-Amiriya. These sessions focussed on items that were in his possession and persons in his company at the time of his arrest. One item was a Glock handgun licensed to the owner from Dokki police station in Egypt. In his company were 12 persons, listed as dangerous and having a criminal record. Four women were also there.

As for the items the officers seized from inside the villa, they included a 39 calibre rifle, seven safes, bullets, three holsters, a rifle "suspected to be an antique", four electric shock batons, a bulletproof vest, four large knives and three Motorola walkie-talkies. In addition, there was hashish; LE56,995, $3,060, and 4,000 Lebanese lira; 16 mobile phones, six wrist watches of various makes and a pair of night-vision goggles; and finally three bottles of alcohol and some gold jewellery.

Outside the villa, the prosecution noted five cars, five lions in locked iron cages, six predatory dogs, four horses, an ostrich and various domesticated animals.

More details should be forthcoming in the coming days, as the investigation continues in this case which has riveted public attention in Egypt due to the accused's shady connections with the former regime and his alleged involvement in electoral rigging and organised violence against demonstrators.

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